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REVISITING AUSTIN V LORAL: A STUDY
IN ECONOMIC DURESS, CONTRACT
MODIFICATION AND FRAMING
Meredith R. Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION
Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp.' is a favorite among Contracts
casebooks2 because the New York Court of Appeals held that it was a
"classic" '3 example of economic duress. The close division of judicial
opinion suggested, however, that there was a more complex story behind
the Court of Appeals' recitation. Indeed, revisiting the case reveals a rich
and intricate story.
In July 1965, Loral Corporation ("Loral"), a publicly traded defense
industry giant, entered into a contract with the government to supply radar
sets for the United States' military efforts in Vietnam (the "First
Government Contract").4 Loral needed materials to manufacture the radar
sets and, in November 1965, entered into a subcontract with Austin
Instrument, Inc. ("Austin"), an "infinitely smaller" manufacturer, to
provide precision gear parts (the "First Subcontract").5 As the conflict in
Vietnam gradually escalated, the government's need for radar sets
* Assistant Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. This article
was written while the author was an Honorable Abraham L. Freedman Fellow and Lecturer
in Law at Temple University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Richard
Greenstein and Eleanor Myers for reviewing earlier drafts, Frances Murray of the New York
Court of Appeals for research leads, and Maureen Holland for her diligent and seemingly
tireless research assistance. Additional thanks are due to Alvin A. Simon, Alvin Krauss and
Morris Dershowitz for taking the time to discuss the case. Finally, the author also wishes to
thank Kimberly Duva for her patience and support.
1. Austin v. Loral, 29 N.Y.2d 124 (1971).
2. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1379, 1462 (1995). Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp. appeared as a
main case in seven of the thirteen contracts textbooks reviewed by the author.
3. Austin, 29 N.Y.2d at 131. Indeed, the front page of the New York Law Journal
reported with the headline: Court Cites 'Classic Example' of Duress in Contract Case,
N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1971, at 1.
4. Id. at 128.
5. Id.
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increased. In May 1966, the government awarded Loral another contract to
supply more radar sets (the "Second Government Contract").6
With the escalation of Vietnam came a market shift in the defense
industry.7 The price of Austin's precision gear parts saw a substantial
market increase.8 Austin's materials and labor costs also rose, however,
causing it significant losses under the First Subcontract. 9 Thus, Austin
apparently threatened to stop production under the First Subcontract unless
Loral agreed to roughly $22,000 in price increases, and to award Austin
another subcontract for the parts Loral needed under the Second
Government Contract (the "Second Subcontract").10 In July 1966, because
Loral feared late deliveries to the government and the consequences of a
liquidated damages clause, Loral surrendered to Austin's threat and agreed
to the price increases." In July 1967, once Austin's performance under the
Second Subcontract was complete, Loral sought to recover the price
increases on the First Subcontract.12 Loral claimed that it acquiesced to
Austin's demands under economic duress.13
Statistically, contractual duress is a losing claim. 14  Nevertheless,
despite early losses, Loral managed to secure a win at the New York Court
of Appeals. Loral's duress claim lost at the trial court after a 5-day trial.
Loral lost its appeal to the Appellate Division by a 3-to-2 vote. Again
closely divided, the Court of Appeals reversed by a 4-to-3 vote, holding
that Loral was precluded from exercising its "free will" when it agreed to
the price increases, making out a "classic" case of duress. However
"classic" the Court of Appeals majority thought the case for duress was, it
was undeniably a close call. Although Loral ultimately won on its claim of
duress, Austin did win the "popular vote" of all the judges by a count of 7
votes for Austin, 6 for Loral.
6. Id. at 129.
7. See text accompanying note 380, infra.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 129.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 130.
13. Id.
14. In published state cases from 1996 through 2003, contractual duress was discussed in
eighty-eight opinions but the court decided in favor of duress in only nine of those cases.
See Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. VA. L.
REv. 443, 463 (2005).
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In light of the closeness of the case, the Court of Appeals' decision
raises many questions. Why were Austin and Loral litigating so fiercely
over roughly $22,000? Was it possible that the threat of Austin, a small,
privately held company, could coerce Loral, a large, publicly traded
company? What influence did the conflict in Vietnam have on the
decision? Parts II and III of this article explore these and other questions
by reconstructing and retelling the story of Austin v. Loral. From the Court
of Appeals' opinion, it would seem that Austin had no purpose in making
the threat other than to extort more money than Loral had agreed to pay
under the First Subcontract. 15 Yet, in revisiting the case, a theme emerges
that Austin's threat to stop production (assuming for now that it can be
called a "threat") was prompted by the market shifts in the defense industry
and Austin's significant losses under the First Subcontract.
16
While the dispute in Austin v. Loral concerned economic duress, it was
also a case of contract modification. 17 Austin was asking Loral to adjust
the price terms under the First Subcontract. The reconstructed story shows
that if Austin had refrained the legal dispute as a question of contract
modification it might have fared better at the Court of Appeals. Part IV of
this article begins by defining and discussing "framing"-that is, the
attorney's technique of presenting the facts and the legal issues in terms
most favorable to her client. This legal technique draws parallels to
theories of cognitive linguists that describe framing as the process of
conceptualizing and communicating ideas.' 8  In that context, linguists
theorize that framing can be employed to control how certain ideas or
values are communicated, allowing the audience to come to a favorable
interpretation of the facts and rule out other, unfavorable interpretations.' 9
15. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game
Theoretic Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 335, 383-84 (1994). Though, some scholars have observed that the opinion
of the Appellate Division majority hints at a very different depiction of the facts; the
Appellate Division notes that Austin's threat came at a "time of continual rising of material
and manufacturing costs." See, e.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTErN, CONCEPTS AND CASE
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 72 (4th ed. 2001).
16. See text accompanying note 380, infra.
17. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 15, at 72.
18. See GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK
3-4 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter MORAL POLITICS].
19. Id. at 372-73; GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! KNOW YOUR VALUES
AND FRAME THE DEBATE 17-18 (2004) [hereinafter FRAME THE DEBATE].
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Part IV presents the frames of contract modification and economic
duress, and discusses the doctrinal differences between them at the time of
Austin v. Loral. Even though the contract involved a sale of goods,2 ° the
courts made no reference to Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") § 2-
209, which addresses contract modifications and appears to apply squarely
to the situation.21 The absence of reference to the U.C.C. is probably
because the parties did not frame the litigation as a question of
modification but, rather, solely as an issue of economic duress. Had Austin
refrained the dispute as one about modification, the Court of Appeals might
well have asked a different question, dictated by the comments to U.C.C. §
2-209: whether Austin acted in good faith in requesting modification of the
First Subcontract. 22 In assessing whether Austin was acting in good faith,
the market changes and Austin's significant losses under the First
Subcontract would have been doctrinally relevant.
While Austin could have refrained the legal dispute, it also could have
argued for a more sensible doctrine of economic duress, one that did not
solely focus on Loral's lack of choices. Part V engages in the current
debate concerning revision of the duress doctrine, with particular attention
to the context of contract modification. In the context of contract
modification, the Second Restatement provides an economic duress inquiry
that collapses into whether (1) the threatening party ("A") acted in good
faith and (2) the threatened party ("B") had no reasonable alternative to
acquiescing to the threat.
23
Part V provides a critique of the duress doctrine's inquiry into B's
choices and chiefly argues that it is redundant with B's lawsuit for duress-
if B had another, reasonable alternative, B would not have surrendered to
A's threat and would have simply sued for breach of contract. Instead, the
article proposes an inquiry solely into whether A acted in good faith. In the
modification context, borrowing from the comments to U.C.C. § 2-209, a
good faith inquiry would look to whether A had a commercially legitimate
reason for the threat and whether the resulting modification is fair in
relation to that reason.24 The good faith inquiry could incorporate as one
20. U.C.C. § 2-105 (2003) defines "goods" as "all things ... which are movable at the
time of identification to the contract for sale .... " The precision gear parts appear to fall
within this definition.
21. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 15, at 72. The U.C.C. was adopted in New York in 1962.
See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4 (5th ed. 2000).
22. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (1970).
23. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 89, 175, 176 (1981).
24. See Henry Mather, Contract Modification Under Duress, 33 S.C. L. REv. 615, 619 (1982).
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suggested factor the economic incentives of A in making the threat and, in
that connection, would more fairly balance the interests of both A and B.25
Using the context of Austin v. Loral as an example, Part V discusses
refocusing the duress doctrine to ask solely whether A (or, Austin) made
the threat in good faith.
II. THE STORY OF AUSTIN V. LORAL
This reconstruction of the story of Austin v. Loral is pieced together in
large part from the record on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
The record contains the transcript of the five-day bench trial before Thomas
A. Aurelio, as special referee, in Supreme Court in New York County.26
The story is also reconstructed by reference to the parties' appellate briefs,
periodical and media sources, and telephone conversations with various
individuals connected to the dispute, including the parties' counsel.
Loral was represented by Alvin A. Simon, who, at the time, was a solo
practitioner specializing in government contracts.27 Loral was Simon's
largest client.28 Austin was represented by the now defunct law firm Salon,
Ortner, Yavers, Dershowitz and Raybin. Morris Dershowitz,29 a partner in
the firm, questioned all of the witnesses on behalf of Austin.
The trial transcript demonstrates heated but civil interactions between
the parties' attorneys. The witnesses' testimony for both sides was, at
times, uncooperative and acerbic; nevertheless, this article treats the
witness' testimony as fact unless it was refuted or internally inconsistent.
Much of the dispute between Austin and Loral was in the characterizations
25. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L.
REv. 717, 755 (2005). See also infra Part V.C.
26. The court heard testimony on December 9, 11, 15, 16, and 17, 1969.
27. Telephone Interview with Alvin A. Simon, Counsel to Loral (June 27, 2005)
[hereinafter 6/27/05 Simon Interview]. Simon, who was trained as an engineer, worked for
Loral in that capacity from 1959 to 1961. Id When Simon graduated from New York
University School of Law in 1961, he was employed by Loral as an attorney. Id. From
1966 to 1983, he worked as a solo practitioner; then, until his retirement in 1996, he went
back to employment with Loral. Id.
28. Id.
29. Morris Dershowitz, a graduate of Brooklyn Law School, was admitted to the New
York Bar in 1942. Coincidentally, he is the uncle of Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard
Law School. Telephone Interview with Morris Dershowitz, Counsel to Austin (June 27,
2005).
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of unrefuted occurrences, and this article reconstructs the story of the case
by elaborating upon these divergent characterizations.
A. THE RISE OF LORAL ELECTRONICS SYSTEMS: A "PHENOMENAL
HORATIO ALGER LIKE GROWTH"
In 1948, Loral Electronics Corporation 30 was founded to produce
electronic equipment for military use.3 1 Loral primarily manufactured
"devices for display of information, navigation equipment, counter-
measure systems and data handling systems. 32 From humble beginnings,
the company grew rapidly during the 1950s and early 1960s.33
Loral's sales fell after the United States' "hot war 'policing' of Korea
ended in 1956. 34 Loral's president responded to the sales slump by leading
the company into fields of defense research and development, a
diversification that began to pay off a few years later.35 In 1959, Loral's
sales reached over $7 million, and then sales "just took off," gradually
reaching $41,million in 1962.36 By 1962, Loral's net income exceeded
$1.77 million.37 In 1963, when Loral went public on the New York Stock
Exchange, one New York Times account described Loral's development as
a "phenominal [sic] Horatio Alger-like growth. 3 8
30. The name "Loral Electronics Corporation" was eventually changed to
"Loral Corporation" in 1964. See MOODY'S INDUS. MANUAL 177 (1965). In
1996, Lockheed Martin Corporation acquired Loral in a "complex deal" valued at
more than $10 billion. See James Stemgold, Lockheed to Acquire Loral in a Deal
Worth $10 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1996, at 47. As part of the deal, Loral's
interest in satellite communications were split off into a new company named
"Loral Space & Communications Corp." See Loral Leftover Could Be Winner-
Communications Satellite Business May Become Lucrative, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan.
10, 1996, at 1C.
31. See David Lidman, Personality: From Lower East Side to the Top, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1963, at 9 (describing the rise and success of Loral's chairman and president, Leon
Albert, from humble beginnings).
32. MOODY'S INDUS. MANUAL 177 (1965).
33. See Lidman, supra note 31, at 11.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. In 1960, Loral's sales reached $17.5 million. In 1961, Loral's sales rose to
$35 million. By 1962, Loral had roughly $41 million in sales. See MOODY'S INDUS.
MANUAL 177 (1965).
37. MOODY'S INDUS. MANUAL 177. (1965)
38 . See Lidman, supra note 31, at 9.
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The mid-1960s continued to see a gradual rise in Loral's net sales,
which grew to nearly $61 million in 1967.39 Undoubtedly, the escalation of
the conflict in Vietnam in the mid-1960s influenced this continued growth
of Loral's business.
B. THE USE OF RADAR IN VIETNAM
Through its various subsidiaries, Loral manufactured radar sets that
were crucial to the military effort in Vietnam.40 Radar, an abbreviation of
"radio detection and ranging," is "an electronic instrument used to detect
and locate moving or fixed objects. '41  It is used to "determine the
direction, distance, height, and speed of objects" that are beyond the range
of human vision.42 Radar sets work by sending radio signals against an
object and analyzing the direction of, and time for, the signal to be
reflected.43 Radar is invaluable to the military for both early warning and
targeting, and it is used in, among other things, air defense, intelligence
gathering and weapon fire control.44 Radar was widely used by both the
North Vietnamese and the United States in the air war in Vietnam.45
46One of Loral's subsidiaries, Loral Electronics Systems, produced a
specific type of radar set, the Doppler. Some radar sets measure the
distance or speed of objects using electronic pulses. 47 A Doppler radar set
uses a continuous signal of energy rather than pulses, which allows the
military to measure the velocity of targets.48 These radar systems, which
Loral manufactured, played an important role in the U.S. efforts in
Vietnam.49
39. MOODY'S INDUS. MANUAL 168 (1968). In 1965, Loral's net sales were roughly $46
million. In 1966 they rose to $58 million, and in 1967 Loral's net sales were roughly $61
million. See MOODY'S INDUS. MANUAL 587 (1967). In 1965 and 1966, Loral's net income
was roughly $1.7 millon and $1.5 million, respectively. Id.
40. See MOODY'S INDUS. MANUAL 587 (1967).
41. G.D. Thome, Radar, in 16 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 64 (2004).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE VIETNAM WAR 337 (Marc Leepson &
Helen Hannaford eds., 1999).
46. With Loral Electronics Corporation, collectively referred to as "Loral."
47. Thome, supra note 41, at 68-69.
48. Id.
49. Loral also produced countermeasure systems. See MOODY'S INDUS. MANUAL 177 (1965).
Countermeasure systems were employed by the U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft jet fighters to
"jam" defensive radar, and by U.S. naval vessels patrolling the coasts of Vietnam to detect radar
Summer 20061
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C. AUSTIN INSTRUMENT, INC.: "AN INFINITELY SMALLER COMPANY" 50
Austin Instrument, Inc. was a privately held New York gear
manufacturer founded by Edmund Krauss in early 1955. 51 Krauss, Austin's
president and sole shareholder, immigrated to the United States in 1939 and
founded Austin as a small machine shop. 52 Eventually, Austin branched
out into precision gears.53  In 1965, Austin had roughly 40 to 50
employees 54 and did roughly $800,000 to $1,000,000 in sales a year.55 The
bulk of Austin's business was subcontracting work on defense industry
prime contracts. 6 Austin and Loral began doing business in the late
1950s;57 Loral was one of Austin's frequent customers.
58
During the 1960s, Austin was a substantially smaller company than
Loral. Interestingly, however, by the time of the appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals in the early 1970s, Loral was suffering a financial slump
that would lead it to the edge of bankruptcy.59
D. JULY 1965: LORAL'S FIRST GOVERNMENT CONTRACT FOR RADAR SETS
In mid-1965, Loral submitted a bid to the government to manufacture
Doppler radar sets for the U.S. Navy's efforts in Vietnam. Loral was the
signals. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIcIONARY OF THE VIETNAM WAR, supra note 45, at 337.
"Jamming" uses special electronic devices to confuse the radar of enemies. Id.
50. Brief of Appellee-Austin at 38, Austin [hereinafter Austin Br.].
51. Record on Appeal to New York Court of Appeals at 526-27, Austin [hereinafter
Record] (Trial Tr. of Edmund Krauss Testimony [hereinafter Krauss Tr.]); Telephone
Interview with Alvin Krauss, son of Edmund Krauss (June 23, 2005) [hereinafter 6/23/05
Krauss Interview]. Alvin Krauss eventually joined his father at Austin.
52. Record, supra note 51, at 570 (Krauss Tr.); 6/23/05 Krauss Interview.
53. 6/23/05 Krauss Interview, supra note 51.
54. Record, supra note 51, at 627 (Krauss Tr.); 6/23/05 Krauss Interview, supra note 51.
55. Record, supra note 51, at 639 (Krauss Tr.). Austin was a flourishing and active
company until it closed its doors in 1998. 6/23/05 Krauss Interview, supra note 51.
56. Record, supra note 51, at 308 (Trial Tr. of Albert Laskow Testimony [hereinafter
Laskow Tr.]). Albert Laskow was Senior Buyer and Purchasing Agent for Loral; he
purchased items and components required to rebuild Loral's end products. Id. at 88. In this
effort, he supervised and directed mechanical buyers. Id.
57. 6/23/05 Krauss Interview, supra note 51.
58. Id.
59. In 1970, despite $50 million in sales, Loral reported net losses. MOODY'S INDUS.
MANUAL 296 (1971). In 1972, Loral was on the verge of bankruptcy when Bernard
Schwartz purchased a controlling interest and built Loral into a $3 billion "aerospace
dynamo." See Andy Pasztor & Jeff Cole, Loral Chief Bernard Schwartz Seeks One More
Feat: Salvaging Globalstar, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2001, at Al; Dave Eisenstadt, Orbiter of
Power, MOTHER JONES, May 1, 1997, available at www.motherjones.com/news/
special reports/coinopcongress/97mojo_400/profile 1.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
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lowest bidder and, on July 15, 1965, the U.S. Navy awarded Loral a
contract to manufacture and deliver a quantity of Doppler navigation radar
sets.60 The original contract price was $3,960,166,61 but through various
modifications, and the government's exercise of an "add-on" option, the
order increased by roughly 300 radar sets 62 and the total contract price
ultimately reached $6,013,228.63 At the time, the contract represented
roughly thirty percent of Loral's total production volume, a significant
portion of its business.64
The First Government Contract contained specific delivery
requirements with stringent default and liquidated damages provisions.
Under the liquidated damages clause, for each day Loral was late on a
delivery date under the contract, Loral would owe the government 0.5% of
the contract price for that item, not to exceed ten percent of the contract
price for that item.65 The contract also included the government's standard
default clause, which allowed the government to terminate the contract if
Loral failed to make deliveries or even if it "fail[ed] to make progress as to
endanger performance." 66 Under the default clause, in addition to
liquidated damages and the loss of any costs incurred in beginning to
60. Record, supra note 51, at 53, 55 (Trial Tr. of Harry Zweiman Testimony [hereinafter
Zweiman Tr.]). Harry Zweiman, Loral's Assistant Manager of Contract Administration, testified
for Loral concerning the relevant specifics of the First Government Contract. Id. at 24.
61. Id. at 58 (Zweiman Tr.).
62. Id. at 60, 65, 68.
63. Id. at 68.
64. Id. at 468 (Trial Tr. of Jules Frohmann Tesitmony [hereinafter Frohmann Tr.]). Jules
Frohmann was Loral's Manager of Operations and was responsible for making sure Loral's
products were delivered to its customers. Id. at 463.
65. Id. at 293 (Laskow Tr.). The liquidated damages clause in the First Government
Contract provided:
[L]iquidated damages imposed in accordance with paragraph F of the clause of
this contract entitled "Default" shall be at the rate of 1/2 of one percent of the
contract price of any article not delivered by the contract delivery date for each
day of delay after the delivery date fixed in the contract, provided, however, that
in no event shall the liquidated damages as to any article exceed 10 percent of the
contract price of that article.
Brief of Appellant-Loral at 11, Austin [hereinafter Loral Main Br.].
66. Loral Main Br., supra note 65, at 12-13; Reply Brief of Appellant-Loral at 34, Austin
Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corporation, 29 N.Y.2d 124 (1971). In effect, the government
could terminate the contract upon any indication or threat of default, without first waiting
for Loral's default to actually occur.
Summer 2006]
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
perform under the contract, Loral would be liable to the government for
any replacement costs.
67
Additionally, the contract incorporated by reference the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations ("ASPR"). 68  The ASPR contained a
provision that barred the Department of Defense from doing further
business with any firm that had a "history of failure to perform, or of
unsatisfactory performance in accordance with the terms of one or more
contracts. 69 Thus, if Loral were to default on its contract, it could be
placed on what was known as a "barred list" and never obtain another
government contract.7 °
Under the First Government Contract, Loral's delivery requirements
were staggered, with the first radar sets due for delivery in May 1966.71
The next delivery under the First Government Contract was due in June
1966, and the final delivery was due in April 1967.72
E. NOVEMBER 1965: LORAL'S FIRST SUBCONTRACT WITH AUSTIN
In order to produce the radar sets under the First Government Contract,
Loral needed to purchase approximately 800 to 1,000 different component
parts from some 500 to 600 subcontractors.73  A subset of these
components consisted of forty precision gear parts.74 Loral sent out its
standardized Request for Quotation form ("RFQ") to roughly thirty
vendors, soliciting quotes for the gear parts.75
Loral sent the RFQ only to vendors on its "approved vendor list,"
which was compiled and updated by Loral's representatives.76 To certify
vendors for approval, Loral representatives visited the vendors' plants
periodically to inspect their facilities and to ensure that they had the
specialized equipment necessary to perform in accordance with military
standards and specifications.77 Austin was one of the precision gear
67. Loral Main Br., supra note 65, at 13.
68. Record, supra note 51, at 28 (Zweiman Tr.).
69. Loral Main Br., supra note 65, at 14.
70. Id.
71. Record, supra note 51, at 292 (Laskow Tr.).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 91,303.
74. Id. at 91.
75. Id. at 89, 91, 92.
76. Id. at 229, 786.
77. Id. at 229, 786.
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manufacturers on Loral's approved vendor list, and Austin was one of the
vendors who received Loral's RFQ.
All of the solicited, approved vendors responded to the RFQ for the
gear parts,78 including Austin.79 Austin was the lowest bidder on twenty-
three of the gear parts and, in November and December of 1965, Loral
awarded Austin nine purchase orders, which covered these twenty-three
parts. The price of the purchase orders totaled approximately $71,624.80
This subcontract was also substantial business for Austin-it constituted
roughly eight percent of Austin's production volume.
Similar to Loral's delivery obligations under the First Government
Contract, Austin was required to make its deliveries to Loral under the First
Subcontract on a staggered basis, with its first delivery due to Loral in
January 1966.81 This gave Loral a four to four-and-one-half month "lead
time" to manufacture the "end item," the radar sets.82 Loral needed
sufficient "lead time" because Austin's gear parts were the first items to go
on the assembly line to produce the radar sets.83
Austin was delinquent in meeting each of its delivery dates under the
First Subcontract-even though the First Subcontract called for the first
delivery to Loral in January 1966, Austin did not begin delivery on some of
the items until May,84 which diminished Loral's lead time to manufacture
the radar sets. Loral's first shipment of radar sets was due to the
government that same month, but it nevertheless managed to make timely
deliveries by "working around the clock." 85
78. Id. at 97.
79. Id. at 658 (Krauss Tr.). Austin responded to the RFQ in October 1965. Id.
80. Id. at 833 (Loral's Ex. T) (Exhibit T is labeled: "Compilation of each purchase order by
part and price, both before and after alleged coercion"). Loral awarded the purchase orders for
the remaining seventeen gear items to a Florida vendor, Space Instruments, Inc. Id. at 206, 225-
26 (Laskow Tr.). There was no written subcontract separate and apart from the executed
purchase orders; the nine purchase orders themselves constituted the First Subcontract.
81. Id. at 652 (Krauss Tr.).
82. Id. at 467 (Frohmann Tr.)
83. Id. at 373 (Trial Tr. of Leon Goldberg Testimony [hereinafter Goldberg Tr.]). Leon
Goldberg was Senior Mechanical Buyer for Loral. Id. at 340; see infra note 96.
84. Id. at 655-58 (Krauss Tr.).
85. See Austin v. Loral, 29 N.Y.2d 124, 132 (1971).
Summer 2006]
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Although Austin was late with deliveries, there was no question that it
was a competent and qualified vendor.86  Commonly, military
subcontractors were late in making deliveries. 87
F. MAY 1966: LORAL'S SECOND GOVERNMENT CONTRACT FOR RADAR SETS
Between the award of the First Government Contract in July 1965 and the
commencement of Loral's first shipment obligations in May 1966, the conflict
in Vietnam continued gradually to escalate.88 Indeed, around this time,
President Johnson supported increased military action in Vietnam.89  This
increase in military effort, in turn, caused a shift in the market for radar sets
and the gear parts used to manufacture them. Thus, the market demand for
Loral's radar sets increased. 90 During this time, the market prices for Austin's
gear parts also rose, but so did its labor and manufacturing costs.9'
On May 3, 1966, Loral was awarded a Second Government Contract for
the production of another quantity of the same radar sets.92 At least in terms of
the hardware, Loral's Second Government Contract was identical to the First.93
As with the First Government Contract, Loral sent out its RFQ form to some
thirty approved vendors and solicited quotes for the forty precision gear parts.94
Austin came in as the lowest bidder on twenty-three of the items.95
G. THE JULY 1966 DEALINGS BETWEEN LORAL AND AUSTIN
On July 1, 1966, as he had done many times, Leon Goldberg, a Senior
Mechanical Buyer for Loral, 96 visited Austin's plant to meet with Austin's
86. Record, supra note 51, at 308 (Laskow Tr.).
87. Id at 143.
88. See Eisenhower Backs Vietnam Strength, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1966, at 6 [hereinafter
Eisenhower Backs Vietnam Strength] (describing escalation of conflict in Vietnam in 1965
and 1966 as gradual).
89. See John D. Pomfret, Johnson Warns Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1966, at 1; see
also Tom Wicker, Johnson and His Use of U.S. Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1965, at 20
(reporting Johnson's pledge not to be driven out of South Vietnam); Eisenhower Backs
Vietnam Strength, supra note 88, at 6 (reporting Eisenhower's desire to "take any action to
win" in Vietnam).
90. Record, supra note 51, at 160 (Laskow Tr.).
91. Id. at 185-87.
92. Id. at 57 (Zweiman Tr.).
93. Id. at 68.
94. Id. at 122 (Laskow Tr.).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 339 (Goldberg Tr.). Goldberg described his job: "My job is to procure
mechanical sub-assemblies and the related components for radar anti-submarine warfare,
which ultimately go into our final systems, which we manufacture." Id. at 340.
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president, Edmund Krauss.97 Goldberg went to Austin "for a two-fold
purpose." 98 First, Goldberg wanted to expedite delivery of the items on
which Austin was already delinquent. 99 Second, Goldberg wanted to
negotiate the prices Austin submitted on the second RFQ. 00
Krauss testified that, at the July 1 meeting, Goldberg told him that
Austin was not being considered for a second subcontract, when other
Loral personnel had promised Austin would get the job.'0 ' Krauss believed
that Austin was not going to be awarded a second subcontract because of
unspecified personal problems between Krauss and Albert Laskow, 10 2 at
the time Loral's Senior Buyer and Purchasing Agent.
0 3
At the July 1 meeting, Goldberg informed Krauss that Loral would
award Austin a second subcontract for only the twenty-three items on
which Austin was lowest bidder. 104 In response, Krauss stated that Austin
wanted to be awarded a second subcontract for all forty parts.10 5 Goldberg
took Krauss's offer back to Loral's management.10 6 Because of Austin's
history of delinquency under the First Subcontract, Loral's management
decided to award Austin purchase orders only for the twenty-three items on
which Austin was the lowest bidder.'
0 7
On Friday, July 15, 1966, Goldberg went back to Austin's plant.
Goldberg explained:
I advised Mr. Krauss[] of Loral's position; and he advised me that he still
wanted the entire package of 40 items, and he would not take anything
less than that. In other words, he was not-he wouldn't be satisfied to
97. Id. at 342; Id. at 526 (Krauss Tr.).
98. Id. at 342 (Goldberg Tr.).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 687 (Krauss Tr.).
102. Id. at 688.
103. Id. at 88 (Laskow Tr.).
104. Id. at 343 (Goldberg Tr.).
105. According to Goldberg, Krauss offered to give Loral a ten percent across the board
reduction if Austin was awarded a second subcontract for all forty parts. Id. at 343.
According to Krauss, however, at this meeting, he never offered Loral a ten percent across
the board reduction. Id. at 689 (Krauss Tr.). In all events, the Special Referee found that by
mid-July the 10% across the board reduction was "long since forgotten." Id. at 838 (Trial
Ct. Opn. [hereinafter Aurelio Opn.]).
106. Id. at 344 (Goldberg Tr.).
107. Id. at 136, 345 (Laskow Tr. and Goldberg Tr.).
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accept just the items that he was low bidder on. He wanted the entire
package. 1
08
Goldberg testified that he did not ordinarily work on Saturdays;
nevertheless, the next day (Saturday, July 16), Goldberg went back to
Austin's plant for a meeting with Krauss. 10 9 Among others on behalf of
Loral, Laskow attended this Saturday meeting with Goldberg.I
10
According to Laskow and Goldberg, at the July 16 meeting, Krauss
"threw [them] for a loop" and threatened to stop production of the parts
under the First Subcontract unless Loral acceded to three demands: (1) a
retroactive increase of ten percent on all items Austin already delivered
under the existing First Subcontract, (2) various, itemized price increases
for parts Austin had not yet manufactured under the existing First
Subcontract and (3) a second subcontract awarding Austin purchase orders
for all forty gear parts.111
Krauss did not deny making these demands but, rather, characterized
them as a matter of negotiation. 112  Krauss testified that the First
Subcontract was a losing proposition for Austin-at that point, to the tune
of $70,000.113 When asked on direct examination what occurred at the July
16 meeting, Krauss testified:
We discussed the job; and I tried -- as always, we are the vendor. We are
the ones that are putting in all the money in the job, on a piece of steel,
and we are at the mercy of our customers. So, we, as always-my policy
always was-we were a two-man shop, and today we are 125 people-is
that the customer is always right. We try to negotiate this and explain [to]
them that we are losing a fortune, and we cannot afford it, and we are
trying to negotiate the price.
I pointed out some of the jobs, which you are getting $2... should bring
$15 to $20.114
Krauss continued to explain that Austin's three demands were a matter
of negotiation for a second subcontract, taking into account its significant
losses under the First Subcontract.
108. Id. at 345 (Goldberg Tr.).
109. Id. at 346
110. Id.
111. Id. at 347-48, 138-39 (Goldberg Tr. and Laskow Tr.).
112. Id. at 550 (Krauss Tr.).
113. Id. at 550, 688, 691.
114. Id. at 549-50.
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The testimony of Loral's own personnel confirmed that there was an
increase in defense industry demand due to the conflict in Vietnam-part
of Loral's case for duress depended upon the increase in demand and the
military exigencies. Laskow testified:
There are certain things which are common knowledge in any industry. In
our industry, at that particular period in our political stature of the
country, we were at war in Viet Nam. It increased in tempo; and, as a
result, most machine shops and gear suppliers felt the impact of this.
And, consequently they were faced with the problem of turning out more
orders than they could possibly handle. Therefore, as a result, the price
structure radically changed at that time." 5
Indeed, between Austin's response to the RFQ for the First Subcontract
in October 1965 and the second RFQ in June 1966, the same gear parts saw
substantial market increases-anywhere from 30% to 150%.116
When asked to describe what happened at the Saturday meeting,
Laskow testified:
We tried to reason with Mr. Krauss[], but he was firm and adamant .
He told us he knew very well we couldn't obtain these gears for the time
we needed them from anyone else. The Viet Nam War was at its peak. It
was common knowledge in the industry that everyone was up to their ears
in work, and they couldn't possibly give us deliveries.
In spite of this, we were going to make every effort to obtain some
commitment from other suppliers. [Mr. Krauss] was very firm.... We
had no alternative.
Finally, we argued with him for hours and left."
17
Consequently, the parties departed the Saturday, July 16 meeting in
discord.
On Monday, July 18 and Tuesday, July 19, 1966, Laskow and other
Loral personnel called around to eight approved precision gear vendors in
attempt to procure a replacement that could rapidly supply the gear parts
for the First Government Contract.' 18 Loral called only those vendors that
115. Id. at 159-60 (Laskow Tr.).
116. Id. at 405 (Goldberg Tr.).
117. Id. at 143 (Laskow Tr.).
118. Id. at 229.
Summer 2006]
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
it had approved and that had copies of the drawings of the precision gear
parts from previous submissions in response to the RFQs.J19 When pressed
why Loral did not call more than eight potential vendors, Laskow testified:
Very few suppliers had the capability to make these parts. You must
understand the complexity of these parts-the specifications involved-
only a limited number of suppliers had the ability to provide parts like
that. 120
To the contrary, of course, Austin built a case that there were many
more gear suppliers that Loral could have contacted to obtain these
precision parts.121 For example, Krauss testified that the "Thomas Register
of American Manufacturers" contained a section listing "hundreds" of gear
manufacturers. 122 For Loral, Laskow did not deny that there were other
precision gear manufacturers; Laskow testified that, on July 18 and 19, he
contacted only those manufacturers who were approved by Loral and those
he already knew manufactured these particular precision gears. 123
Moreover, for each of the eleven gear manufacturers that Krauss testified
that Loral could have called, Laskow provided an explanation why each
vendor was not a viable replacement option. 12
4
The foremost concern for Loral was timing. Because of Austin's
delinquencies under the First Subcontract, much of Loral's four-month
"lead time" to build the radar sets had elapsed.1 25 Of the eight vendors that
Loral called, the earliest any of the vendors could promise initial deliveries
of the precision parts was in twelve or fourteen weeks (i.e., at earliest,
around the week of October 3).126 The rest of the vendors could, at best,
promise initial deliveries in twenty to twenty-two weeks.' 27 Because of the
119. Id. at 312.
120. Id. at 326.
121. See, e.g., Id. at 586 (Krauss Tr.).
122. Id. at 586-87.
123. Id. at 228, 229, 786 (Laskow Tr.).
124. Id. at 787-92. Of the eleven gear manufacturers that Krauss testified that Loral
could have contacted to procure a replacement, Laskow testified that four of them could not
deliver in time, two did not make "non-standard parts," two had been removed from Loral's
approved vendor list for poor quality, one had gone out of business, one had previously
advised Loral it was too busy to take on new work and one had previously advised Loral
that the required material was too abrasive and would damage its equipment. See Loral
Main Br., supra note 65, at 31-32.
125. Record, supra note 51, at 217-18 (Laskow Tr.).
126. Loral Main Br., supra note 65, at 24; Record, supra note 51, at 35a (Loral's
Response to Bill of Particulars).
127. Loral Main Br., supra note 65, at 24; Record, supra note 51, at 35a (Loral's
Response to Bill of Particulars).
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already diminished "lead time," these initial delivery dates would not have
allowed Loral to timely deliver the completed radar sets to the Navy under
the First Government Contract.
However, Austin's witnesses testified that it was possible to have the
gear parts delivered in four to six weeks if Loral would "pay the price"-
i.e., a premium for expedited delivery. 128 Concerned about making timely
deliveries under Loral's First Government Contract, Laskow and the others
inquired only whether the vendors could complete the job quickly, and did
not discuss price.
129
In the midst of Loral's attempts to find a replacement, Krauss visited
Loral's plant on Tuesday, July 19, and reiterated Austin's demands and,
according to Loral, again threatened to stop production on the First
Subcontract. 130 While Krauss did not deny making the demands, he did,
however, deny that he ever threatened to stop production of the parts under
the existing First Subcontract.' 3' Rather, Krauss testified that he informed
Loral that he could not deliver parts.' 32 When asked the reasons Krauss
gave why Austin would not continue deliveries under the First Subcontract,
Laskow testified:
The only reason [Mr. Krauss] gave us was that he was not making enough
money on the parts that he was manufacturing; that he could make more
money doing similar parts for other customers; and this was obviously
because the Viet Nam War started and customers were paying any price to
get these. 133
Krauss still denies to this day that he threatened to stop production and
still maintains that he was simply negotiating for better prices on the First
Subcontract and to obtain a second subcontract. 34 Krauss confirmed that
Austin did not deliver a shipment of 100 gear parts to Loral on July 18,
1966, but he testified that the shipments were halted because Austin's plant
was closed for vacation.
1 35
128. Record, supra note 51, at 762 (Trial Tr. of Testimony of Jack Sherin [hereinafter
Sherin Tr.]). Sherin was Austin's Manufacturing Manager. Id. at 748-50.
129. Id. at 794-95 (Laskow Tr.).
130. Id. at 138-39, 258.
131. Id at 551, 553 (Krauss Tr.).
132. Id. at 551.
133. Id. at 158 (Laskow Tr.).
134. 6/23/05 Krauss Interview, supra note 51.
135. Record, supra note 51, at 530, 533-35 (Krauss Tr.).
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Austin began its vacation period that Monday, July, 18, 1966, which
lasted through Monday, August 2.136 During this vacation period, Austin
kept only a skeleton work crew and productions and deliveries were
halted.137 Krauss testified that this two-week period was the only time
when production was stopped on Loral's gear parts. 138 Krauss testified that
he told Loral about the vacation period:
I told [Loral] that we are negotiating this contract, in the midst of
negotiations, and all that, and [Austin is] having a vacation time period,
and [Austin] cannot put overtime in there, and to put more time in there
while [Austin doesn't] have anybody in there, and [Austin] cannot deliver
for a few days until we are straightening out our problems of getting the
prices and all our problems resolved.
139
From Loral's perspective, Austin had halted production under the First
Subcontract, and Loral had no feasible replacement vendor. Jules
Frohmann, at the time Loral's Manager of Operations,140 testified:
I had a couple of types of alternatives. One, I guess I co[u]ld terminate
Austin Instrument at that point in time. However, with the lead time
involved, to again get new parts, which would run you anywhere from
close to 14 or 15 weeks at a minimum, I would find myself in a long gap,
and I would be unable to make my deliveries again.
The other kind of alternative would be to continue with Austin and also
place an order elsewhere. But, during these 14 or 15 weeks while we
were waiting for deliveries elsewhere, Austin would be delivering parts;
and what would I do with all the parts I had from the second contractor?
So, I had two alternatives completely unsati[s]factory to me. So, I had to
pay Austin his increased price and continue.
141
Loral did not request that the government provide an extension of the
delivery requirements under the First Government Contract. 142  Rather,
faced with these "unsatisfactory" alternatives, Loral decided to acquiesce to
Austin's demands.
136. Id. at 552.
137. Id. at 530.
138. Id. at 553.
139. Id. at 534-35.
140. Id. at 464 (Frohmann Tr.).
141. Id. at 483-84.
142. Id. at 515.
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H. LORAL'S ACQUIESCENCE: "WE HAVE FEVERISHLY SURVEYED OTHER
SOURCES OF SUPPLY"
Loral agreed to award Austin a second subcontract for all forty
required gear parts. 143 Loral also agreed to the retroactive and prospective
price adjustments on the items under the First Subcontract. 144 However,
Loral did not quietly acquiesce to the price increases under the First
Subcontract.
On July 22, 1966, Loral sent a three-page letter to Austin, to the
attention of Krauss. 145 The letter, which is signed by Frohmann as Loral's
Manager of Operations, was actually drafted for Frohmann's signature by
Loral's attorney, Alvin A. Simon. 1
46
The July 22 letter began by detailing the purchase orders under the
First Subcontract, by item number, part number, quantity on order, unit
price and quantity delivered to date. 47 Loral noted to Austin that the gear
parts were "vital and indispensable for the fabrication and manufacture...
of Radar Dopplers" under the First Government Contract "involving
millions of dollars."'
148
The letter then skillfully continued to recap the events leading to
Loral's acquiescence:
It is common knowledge that these Radar Dopplers are used in military
aircraft, are in very short supply and critical to the current military operations
in which this Country is presently engaged. Nevertheless, work on the
subcontract parts and components on order with you has been stopped.
Your reason, to state your position as conveyed to us by telephone and in
conferences, is that these Purchase Orders or Fixed-Price Subcontracts were
placed and accepted by you some 8 months ago; that your costs of
manufacture have risen since then and that even though you have made partial
deliveries under the subcontract, items or components are partially fabricated
in your shop to various degrees of completion, you have notified us that
143. Id. at 185-87 (Laskow Tr.).
144. Id. at 302.
145. Id. at 827 (Loral's Ex. Q). The July 22, 1966 letter is reproduced in its entirety infra
in Appendix 1.
146. 6/27/05 Simon Interview, supra note 27: Record, supra note 51, at 827; see infra
Appendix 1.
147. Record, supra note 51, at 827; see infra Appendix 1.
148. Record, supra note 51, at 827; see infra Appendix 1.
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further work on these items or components will leave you with a loss at the
subcontract prices agreed upon, which you refuse to incur.
You have, therefore, advised us simply and unqualifiedly, as mentioned,
that further work on these subcontracts has been stopped and that such
work will not be resumed unless we agree to an increase in the
subcontract prices by paying you an additional 10% on the parts and
components already delivered and paid for, and also increase the unit
prices on all undelivered components[.] 149
Next, the letter continued by explaining why Loral acquiesced:
We are obliged to tell you that, aside from the drastic consequences to
which we open ourselves were we to default on our Radar Doppler...
Prime Contract with the Government because of your failure to deliver the
subcontract parts and components to us at the prices undertaken, a critical
U.S. military operation may be jeopardized.
As matters stand, the success or failure of our contract performances and
of this critical military operation depends upon timely receipt by us of the
balance of the subcontract parts and components on which you have
stopped work and refused to deliver.
We have feverishly surveyed other sources of supply and find that
because of the prevailing military exigencies, were they to start from
scratch as would have to be the case, they could not even remotely begin
to deliver on time to meet the delivery requirements established by the
Government in its Radar Doppler Prime Contract with us.
Accordingly, we are left with no choice or alternative but to meet your
conditions.
1 50
In addition to Loral's shrewd characterization of the events leading to
its acquiescence, the July 22 letter set forth a schedule detailing the
prospective price increases on each of the undelivered items.1 51  The
schedule shows that the increases on many of the items were substantial,
averaging a sixty-seven percent increase per item and ranging from a 19%
149. Record, supra note 51, at 827; see infra Appendix 1.
150. Record, supra note 51, at 827; see infra Appendix 1.
151. Record, supra note 51, at 827; see infra Appendix 1. The schedule in the July 22
letter does not represent all of the increases because, in a letter later that week, Austin added
three more items that are not listed in this schedule. Record, supra note 51, at 829 (Loral's
Ex. R). This July 27 letter is reproduced in its entirety infra in Appendix 2.
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increase on one item to a 123% increase on another. 52 Indeed, the total
prospective increases amounted to approximately $19,000 and, when
combined with the approximately $3,000 in retroactive increases, totaled
roughly $22,000, or an almost 30% increase on the original $71,624
contract price. 
153
More compelling than the numbers, perhaps, is the artful choice of
wording in Loral's correspondence to Austin. Loral is certain to point out a
few times in the three-page letter that the radar sets are "vital and
indispensable," "in very short supply" and "critical to the current military
operations."' 54  Loral wrote that Austin "simply and unqualifiedly"
threatened to stop work under the First Subcontract, which could have
"drastic consequences" for Loral.155 And, the line of the letter that is likely
indelible in the minds of many first-year Contracts students: Loral has
"feverishly surveyed other sources of supply" and "because of the
prevailing military exigencies" a replacement vendor "could not even
remotely begin to deliver on time to meet the delivery requirements
established by the Government," leaving Loral with "no other choice" than
to acquiesce to Austin's demands.
1 56
The lawyerly style of Loral's July 22 letter stands in contrast to Krauss'
testimony about the sophistication level of Austin's operations. Krauss
explained that Austin "did not have no lawyers." 157 Krauss made clear: "I
don't have anybody . . . I don't have no legal staff and I don't have no
departments."' 58
After the July 22 letter, the parties had a telephone conversation about
the increases, which Austin referenced in its letter to Loral, dated July 27,
1966.159 Austin did not disclaim that it coerced Loral to agree to the
demands, at least not in writing. Austin's letter served to (1) add certain
price increases that Loral had omitted from the July 22 letter and (2) make
152. See infra Appendix 1 (setting forth the schedule at the beginning of the July 22
letter). The smallest price increase was from $4.10 to 4.90 and the largest increase was
from $1.90 to $4.25.
153. Record, supra note 51, at 833 (Loral's Ex. T).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. Record, supra note 51, at 627 (Krauss Tr.).
158. Id.
159. Id. 829 (Loral's Ex. R); see infra Appendix 2.
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other itemized corrections to quantities shipped. 160  The letter closed by
asking Loral to mail delivery schedules, and assuring that Austin would
"make every effort to meet them."' 16 1
Loral responded to Austin in an August 4, 1966 letter.162 Much of the
letter quibbled about whether certain items were delivered as Austin
claimed, and it also continued to further build Loral's record for a claim of
duress.163 Loral stated:
For the reasons outlined in our July 22 letter, we reiterate that we find
ourselves in no position to take issue with either the price increases or
other conditions you have specified as the basis for continuing with
performance of the Purchase Orders or subcontracts between us.' 64
The parties then executed the amended purchase orders, thereby
modifying the First Subcontract in writing. The parties also revised
Austin's delivery schedules. Despite Loral's need for quick deliveries, it
allowed Austin delivery extensions, with some deliveries under the
amended purchase orders extended until mid-September 1966.165
Questioning Laskow concerning Loral's claim of time exigencies in light
of the delivery extensions Loral gave to Austin, Austin's attorney pressed:
Q: Would it appear to an impartial observer that your time wasn't that
critical that you could not accept a September 19th delivery on some of
these parts?
A: If the observer was impartial and would listen to all the evidence I
presented, he would recognize that it would have been unreasonable for
me to expect delivery sooner, in spite of the fact that I needed it sooner. 6 6
Incidentally, none of Loral's letters attempted to build a record for
coercion in its agreement to award Austin all forty gear parts in the Second
Subcontract. Eventually, in Loral's complaint, it never claimed duress in
160. Record, supra note 51, at 829; see infra Appendix 2.
161. Record, supra note 51, at 829; see infra Appendix 2.
162. Record, supra note 51, at 831 (Loral's Ex. S). The August 4, 1966 letter is
reproduced infra in Appendix 3.
163. Record, supra note 51, at 831 (Loral's Ex. S). The August 4, 1966 letter is
reproduced infra in Appendix 3.
164. Record, supra note 51, at 831 (Loral's Ex. S). The August 4, 1966 letter is
reproduced infra in Appendix 3. Loral is also careful to point out to Austin that:
The opening paragraph of our July 27 letter speaks of your acceptance of the terms and
conditions of our July 22 letter. We call attention to the fact that it is, rather, we who find
ourselves without choice but to accept your terms and conditions.
165. Record, supra note 51, at 323 (Laskow Tr.).
166. Id. at 323-24.
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entering into the Second Subcontract, just the First. Loral did not claim
duress as to the portion of the Second Subcontract that awarded Austin the
seventeen items for which Austin was not the lowest bidder.
Also, there were sizeable price increases under the Second Subcontract
for the same gear parts that Austin agreed to manufacture under the First
Subcontract. 167  On cross-examination, Austin's attorney shared the
following exchange with Laskow about the price increases between the
First and Second Subcontracts and Loral's agreement to award Austin all
forty items in the Second Subcontract:
Q: I was asking if you had any personal knowledge at this point of the
price differential between Item A on the first contract and Item A on the
second.
A: From my knowledge, it was higher on the second contract. Would that
be adequate to satisfy you?
Q: What was the reason for giving a price increase on the second
contract?
A: There were many reasons. One is-the most obvious reason is the fact
that you cannot buy an automobile for the same price today as you did
two years ago. The cost of labor and materials have risen since the first
contract. There are other reasons; but that's one.
Q: Didn't you just say now that you gave [Mr. Krauss] the full amount
and the higher prices because there was a gun to your head on the second
contract?
A: I did not.
Q: What did you say?
A: You asked two questions. Why did we pay a higher price for the same
items. I said for many reasons. One was that the first contract was lower
than the market of the second contract. And the second reason, why did
we place all forty items? Because I could have bought all of the-part of
the forty items cheaper elsewhere, but I had no choice. I figured he had a
gun to my head. Unless I took all forty items, he would not start
production on my parts.' 
68
167. Id. at 183-84.
168. Id. at 186-87.
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In sum, Loral's position was that the price increases between the First
and Second Subcontracts simply reflected market increases. 169  As for
awarding all forty items to Austin under the Second Subcontract, Laskow
appeared to testify that Loral did so under duress, but Loral's complaint did
not claim economic duress in executing the Second Subcontract. 70
After August 4, the parties went about performance on their respective
subcontracts and prime contracts. Toward the end of Austin's performance
of the Second Subcontract, Loral began to withhold payments owed to
Austin.171 When Austin made its final deliveries to Loral under the Second
Subcontract, Loral (concededly) owed Austin roughly $17,756.172 On July
21, 1967, three days after Austin completed performance of the Second
Subcontract, Loral wrote to Austin:
We are advised that such price increases [on the First Subcontract] may
not be retained. We must accordingly notify you that unless these price
increases are credited or refunded to us in full, appropriate action will be
taken to secure our legal rights in this matter.
173
Austin never disclaimed the coercion in writing and refused to refund
the increases on the First Subcontract.1
74
III. THE LITIGATION: COERCION OR COMMERCIALLY
UNDERSTANDABLE RENEGOTIATION?
On September 7, 1967, Austin commenced suit against Loral in New
York Supreme Court, Nassau County, to recover the unpaid $17,756.171 On
the very same day, Loral commenced suit against Austin in New York
Supreme Court, Westchester County, to recover the roughly $22,000 in
increases on the First Subcontract, alleging that it agreed to the price
increases under duress. 176 The parties agreed to consolidate the actions in
169. Id. at 405 (Goldberg Tr.).
170 Loral's attorney did not claim duress in entering into the Second Subcontract because
Austin's threat was to breach the First Subcontract. Loral's attorney believed a duress claim
as to the Second Subcontract was weak and did not want to "muddy the waters" for the
strong duress claim concerning the price increases under the First Subcontract. 6/27/05
Simon Interview, supra note 27.
171. Id.
172. Record, supra note 51, at 18 (Trial Tr., Att'y Colloquoy).
173. Id at 817 (Austin's Ex. 6). The July 21, 1967 letter is reproduced in its entirety
infra in Appendix 4.
174. Loral Main Br., supra note 65, at 51.
175. Record, supra note 51, at 13a, 14a (Austin's Complaint).
176. Id. at 9a, 9b (Loral's Complaint).
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New York County. 177 Based upon the record on appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals, it does not appear that the parties engaged in motion
practice prior to the commencement of the trial on December 9, 1969.
A. THE PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC DURESS
It bears noting that, at all stages of the litigation, the doctrine of
economic duress was not in question. At the trial court and the appellate
courts, some basic legal principles regarding economic duress were treated as
settled and were unanimously enunciated by the courts. These principles
were, namely, that: (1) a contract is voidable on grounds of duress when the
threatened party was forced to agree to the threat by means that preclude the
threatened party from exercising its "free will," (2) a threat by one party to
breach a contract by not delivering required items, though wrongful, does not
in itself constitute duress, (3) it must appear that the threatened party cannot
obtain the goods from any other source and (4) in order to establish duress,
the threatened party must demonstrate that an ordinary remedy for breach of
contract would not have been adequate. 178 The following description of the
litigation proceeds against this doctrinal backdrop.
B. TRIAL AND REFEREE'S OPINION: "No BASIS FOR A FINDING OF DURESS"
The five-day bench trial before Thomas A. Aurelio, as special referee,
ended on December 17, 1969. Aurelio was a seasoned supreme court
justice in New York County, who had been nominated to the court in
1943.179 As the result of a coin toss, Austin was designated plaintiff, and
Loral defendant, for the purposes of the trial.18
0
Roughly three months after the trial ended, on March 25, 1970, Aurelio
entered judgment against Loral and filed a decision with the New York
County Clerk's office. 18 1 Aurelio held that Loral failed to establish that it
177. Id. at 837 (Aurelio Opn.).
178. See Austin v. Loral, 29 N.Y.2d 124, 130-31 (1971); Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral
Corp., 316 N.Y.S.2d 528, 531-33 (App. Div. 1970); Record, supra note 51, at 840-43
(Aurelio Opn.).
179. Aurelio's rise to the bench was fraught with controversy. In 1943, a conversation
recorded by federal prosecutors through electronic surveillance made front-page news.
Aurelio was caught thanking Frank Costello, a top New York City crime boss with
extensive ties to Tammany Hall, for Costello's support of his nomination to the bench. In
the taped conversation, Aurelio also promised Costello his "undying loyalty." Gangster
Backed Aureliofor Bench, Prosecutor Avers, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug., 23, 1943, at 1.
180. Record, supra note 51, at 837 (Aurelio Opn.).
181. Id.
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agreed to the price increases under economic duress. 182 Aurelio found that,
when Loral wrote its July 22 letter, it was not in default under the First
Government Contract and Loral "explicitly admitted... that it had never
received any warning from the government of threatened termination of
either of its two contracts."' 183 Based on these facts, the special referee
found that "whether Loral was then faced with an immediate emergency
may not be said to be free from doubt."'
' 84
Even assuming the presence of an emergency, the referee held that
Loral did not satisfactorily prove that it could not have procured the
precision gear parts from another vendor.' 85 Aurelio noted that "[a]ll Loral
did was make a few telephone calls to other possible sources of supply"
and, on the facts, this effort was "neither reasonable nor commensurate
with the urgency and gravity of the situation which Loral asserts it was
confronted and, therefore, wholly insufficient to support a finding that the
items were not obtainable elsewhere."'
186
The referee "noted" that "Loral had a high regard for Austin's know-
how and its good quality workmanship in manufacturing these gears and
for that reason leaned towards preferring to do business with Austin, other
things being equal."'' 87 Aurelio thus held that "[t]he conclusion becomes
inescapable that Loral weighed all the considerations and determined as a
matter of business judgment to continue with Austin and acted
voluntarily.'
' 88
When this decision was issued, Loral's attorney, Alvin A. Simon, was
"shocked."' 189 Simon went to the president of Loral and told him that the
decision was wrong and offered to waive attorneys' fees if Loral permitted
him to take an appeal. 190 Loral's president gave Simon his blessing to
182. Id. at 837-44.
183. Id. at 841.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 842.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 843.
188. Id. Aurelio also determined that Loral's placing of the purchase orders for
the Second Subcontract and the increase of the prices under the First Subcontract
were "part and parcel of the same transaction." Id. Given this conclusion, Aurelio
held that Loral could not disaffirm the contract in part by rejecting the price
increases. Id. This issue of partial disaffirmance, though briefed by the parties,
was not addressed by either of the appellate courts.
189. Telephone Interview with Alvin A. Simon, Counsel to Loral (June 10, 2005).
190. Id.
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litigate the appeal.' 91 Simon filed an appeal on behalf of Loral in the
Appellate Division, First Department. The fact that Simon waived his
attorneys' fees helps explain why Loral continued to litigate this $22,000
case at what, after a five-day trial, would otherwise appear to be a loss.
Austin defended the appeals not based upon financial reasons, but rather as
a matter of principle. 
92
C. LORAL'S APPEAL TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION: 3-TO-2 AFFIRMANCE
IN FAVOR OF AUSTIN
The Appellate Division issued its decision on December 17, 1970,
exactly one year after the trial ended. 193 Justice Samuel W. Eager, who was
joined by Justices Arthur Markewich and James B. M. McNally, 194
authored the majority decision affirming the judgment against Loral. 195
The majority concluded that "the findings of the referee are fully
supported by the evidence except insofar as the same may be inconsistent
with the findings herein set forth." 196 The factual findings of the Appellate
Division majority did not necessarily conflict with those of the referee, but
the Appellate Division did provide a somewhat more detailed recitation of
the facts. For example, the majority noted that "Austin claimed that it was
losing a substantial sum on the existing job; that it could not afford this;
and that the prices being paid to it were only a fraction of what it was
entitled to.' ' 197 The majority also noted "parenthetically" that "it is well
known that in this time of continual rising of material and manufacturing
191. Id.
192. Telephone Interview with Alvin Krauss, son of Edmund Krauss (Aug. 1, 2005).
193. Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 316 N.Y.S.2d 528 (App. Div. 1970).
194. Justice Eager wrote the decision while he was nearing the end of his twelve-year
term on the bench; he served on the Appellate Division from 1960 to 1972. Judges of the
Appellate Division, First Department, at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/adl/
centennial/justices.shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
Justice McNally, who concurred with Eager, was also a veteran of the bench; he served
on the Appellate Division from 1957 to 1972. Id. See also Alfred E. Clark, James McNally
Was a Justice in the State's Appellate Division, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1982, at D 18.
The other member of the majority, Arthur Markewich, was more recently elevated to the
Appellate Division in 1968. See Eric Pace, Arthur Markewich, 86, A Justice on Panel That
Disbarred Nixon, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1993, at A17.
195. Austin, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
196. Id. at 530.
197. Id.
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costs, renegotiation of contract prices does sometimes occur in business
and commercial dealings."'
' 98
The Appellate Division majority elucidated some other key factual
points. Concerning Austin's work stoppage, the majority found that,
"[a]lthough there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Loral was
told [in mid-July 1966] that deliveries would be stopped, the situation was
still fluid in the sense that Austin could be prevailed upon to resume normal
deliveries following the vacation period."1 99  Moreover, the majority
characterized Loral's July 22 and August 4 letters as "self-serving" and
found that the letters "indicate that [Loral] was deliberately acting with the
intent of attempting to lay the basis for an alleged cause of action for
economic duress" and Loral's actions were, therefore, voluntary.2 °0
Further, expressly as a matter of fact, the Appellate Division majority
also found that "Loral was at no time under any immediate urgency or
government pressure for deliveries under the Navy contract" because Loral
had not defaulted on the First Government Contract and had not received
"any warning or notice from the government of dissatisfaction. 2 0°  The
court noted that Loral did not find it necessary to contact the government to
seek an extension of time to make its deliveries. 20 2 In this connection, the
majority held that Loral's "'self-imposed, undisclosed and subjective fears
do not constitute an act of duress ... cognizable in law."' 20 3
The majority additionally noted that, after Loral agreed to the price
increases, Loral extended Austin's delivery requirements under the First
Subcontract until September 1966.204 Based upon these circumstances, the
majority determined that "Loral was acting calmly and with considerable
deliberation rather than because of an immediate urgency due to fear of
government reprisals., 20 5  Thus, the court held that, under the
circumstances, Loral was acting of its own "free will" and Austin's threat
to stop work under the First Subcontract did not constitute a basis for
actionable duress.20 6
198. Id.
199. Id. at 530-31.
200. Id. at 531.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. (quoting Joseph F. Egan, Inc. v. City of New York, 17 N.Y.2d 90, 98 (1970)).
204. Id. at 531.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 531, 533.
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The Appellate Division majority determined that "Austin was a
responsible manufacturer and it was not established that its claims for
retroactive price increases were made other than in good faith. '20 7 The
majority echoed Aurelio's determination that Loral did not make sufficient
efforts to locate other possible vendors to supply the precision gear parts,
and held that Loral could have procured another vendor and sued Austin
for breach of contract.20 8
Yet, the two-Justice dissent, written by Justice Aron Leonard Steuer
and joined by Justice Emilio Nunez, 20 9 would have held that Loral
acquiesced to Austin's demands under economic duress.210 Justice Steuer's
dissent began by stating that the facts were "virtually undisputed" and no
"serious question of law" existed; however, the difficulty was in applying
the law to the facts.21' The dissent appeared to adopt Loral's
characterization of certain undisputed facts.
First, the dissent viewed Loral's efforts to procure a replacement
vendor in a different light than the majority. The dissent determined that,
while Loral only made a few telephone calls to find a replacement vendor,
it was uncontroverted that Loral called every source known to it, and
Austin did not suggest any additional sources Loral could have called.
212
Second, the dissent noted that there was no dispute that Loral was in
serious danger of default under the First Government Contract, and no
dispute concerning the effect of such a default on Loral's ability to do
business with the government in the future.21 3 Moreover, in response to the
suggestion that Loral should have requested an extension of time from the
207. Id. at 532.
208. Id.
209. Justice Steuer was also a veteran of the bench at the time of the decision, serving on
the Appellate Division from 1961 to 1974. See Judges of the Appellate Division, First
Department, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/adl/centennialljustices.shtm (last visited
Apr. 21, 2006); see also Elizabeth Kolbert, Aron Steuer, Served as Appellate Justice in New
York Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1985, at B10.
Justice Nunez, who served on the Appellate Division from 1969-1977, was the first Latino
judge on the New York State Supreme Court and, later, Appellate Division. See Lawrence
Van Gelder, Emilio Nunez is Dead at 91; Pioneering Hispanic Judge, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
1995, at 26; Judges of the Appellate Division, First Department,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/adl/centennial/justices.shtm (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
210. Austin, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 535.
213. Id.
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government, the dissent stated that this point was "merely an argument, not
proof' and, in any event, "too tenuous to consider., 21 4 Thus, the Appellate
Division dissent would have held that Loral "did all it could to find a
substitute supplier and it was faced with a situation in which an action for
breach of contract would not provide adequate relief."
215
Additionally, the dissent took issue with the majority's depiction of
Loral as acquiescing to Austin's threat because Loral wanted Austin, not
some other vendor, as Loral's supplier.21 6 The dissent pointed out that
Loral protested its acquiescence in writing.217 The dissent also observed
that the majority disregarded the "ineluctable fact that what precipitated
[Austin's] demands was the fact that [Loral] did not want [Austin] as
supplier for a substantial number of items. 21 8
D. THE ARGUMENTS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
The two-Justice dissent permitted Loral to appeal as of right to the New
York Court of Appeals. 219  Loral did not challenge the standards for
economic duress set forth by the courts below. Rather, Loral challenged
the application of those standards to the facts of the case. The theme of
Loral's brief capitalized on the concept that the key element in a case of
duress is the state of mind of the person alleged to be threatened.220 Loral's
primary arguments on appeal were that: (1) the courts below did not apply
the proper legal criteria in finding that Loral did not face an immediate and
critical emergency, (2) by all legal standards, Loral made every reasonable
effort to obtain the precision gear parts elsewhere, (3) the legal conclusion
that Loral was acting voluntarily was unsupported and unwarranted and (4)
Loral promptly disaffirmed by sending Austin the July 1967 letter three
221days after Austin completed deliveries under the Second Subcontract.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 560 1(a) (McKinney 1962).
220. Loral Main Br., supra note 65, at 14.
221. See id. at i-ii. Though the Court of Appeals did not treat these arguments as central
to the appeal, Loral also argued that: (1) it was bound by a duty to mitigate damages at the
same time it was looking to procure an alternative vendor, (2) the First and Second
Subcontracts were two separate transactions, and Loral could thus disaffirm one and not the
other and (3) the Appellate Division affirmance was based upon a general misconception of
the facts. Id.
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Austin responded by arguing that Loral's "story is terrifying, but it is
entirely lacking in credibility. '222 Central to Austin's theory was the rule
that the Court of Appeals should not disturb a finding of fact if there is
evidence to sustain it.223 With this rule in mind, Austin contended that the
Court of Appeals should not disturb the findings that (1) Loral did not face
an immediate emergency and (2) the precision gear parts were available to
224Loral through other sources. Austin's premise was that it had not applied
undue economic pressure but, rather, it had simply attempted to renegotiate
the First Subcontract.
Notably, a theme of Austin's brief was that of David versus Goliath.
Austin painted itself as "infinitely smaller" than Loral. 225 While there was
a relative size difference between the companies during their 1966-1967
dealings, any imbalance of power that could have been attributed to this
size difference appears to have been offset by the fact that Austin's gear
parts were complex and only a limited number of suppliers had the ability
to produce them to military specifications.
E. THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECISION: 4-TO-3 FOR REVERSAL
IN FAVOR OF LORAL
The New York Court of Appeals at the time consisted of Chief Judge
Stanley H. Fuld and Associate Judges Adrian P. Burke, John F. Scileppi,
Francis Bergan, Matthew J. Jasen, Charles D. Brietel and James Gibson.226
222. Austin Br., supra note 51, at 12.
223. Id. at 16-17.
224. Id. at 5-11. Austin's other, arguably peripheral, contentions were that: (1) Loral's
mitigation of damages argument was irrelevant because there was no claim of breach of
contract and (2) because the First and Second Subcontracts were part of the same
renegotiation, Loral had to affirm or disaffirm in toto. See id. at 20, 23, 34.
225. Id. at 14, 18 ("Loral attempted to paint a picture in which it, a multi-million-
dollar corporation, was victimized by one of its subcontractors. The trier of facts and
the majority simply did not believe its trumped-up claims.") Austin argued:
Loral, a corporation whose government sales have aggregated hundreds of millions
of dollars, whose stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, is asking this
Court to invoke the extraordinary remedy of economic duress to abrogate a written
contract it entered into with Austin, an infinitely smaller company.
Id. at 38.
226. Interestingly, Alvin Krauss suggested that there was suspicion that the Court of
Appeals reversal could be explained by the fact the judges were law school classmates of
Loral's attorney. 6/23/05 Krauss Interview, supra note 51. It is worth noting, however, that
Loral's counsel, Alvin A. Simon, graduated from New York University Law School in
1961. None of the New York Court of Appeals judges in either the majority or dissent
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At the time the case was argued, transcripts and other recordings were not
taken at oral argument before the court. Alvin Simon, attorney for Loral,
227remembers exhausting his allotted oral argument time on one issue.
When his time was up, Simon asked Chief Judge Fuld whether he could
have a few more minutes to address one other issue.228 Apparently
exasperated, Judge Fuld looked around at his colleagues.2 29 Judge Fuld
told Simon to "go ahead," then he exited the courtroom.23 ° Mr. Simon left
oral argument thinking that Judge Fuld was, for sure, one vote he did not
have.231 The opposite turned out to be true.
Joined by Judges Burke,232 Scileppi,233 and Gibson,234 Chief Judge Fuld
wrote for the majority, which reversed the Appellate Division and held that
Loral had surrendered to Austin's threat under economic duress.235
Chief Judge Fuld's background was as a "hard-nosed prosecutor."
236
Fuld practiced privately from 1926 to 1935.237 In 1935, Thomas E. Dewey,
attended New York University Law School, and all of the judges attended law school many
years before Mr. Simon. See Historical Society of the Courts of New York, at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/Judges.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
227. Telephone Interview with Alvin A. Simon (June 10, 2005), supra note 189.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Judge Adrian Burke was elected to the New York Court of Appeals in 1955 and
served until 1973. See Wolfgang Saxon, Burke, 95, Appeals Court Judge, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000, at B8. Both before and after serving on the New York Court of
Appeals, Burke served as Corporation Counsel of the City of New York; first, under Mayor
Robert F. Wagner in 1954, then again, under Mayor Abraham D. Beame in 1974. Id.
(Judges were elected to the New York Court of Appeals until 1977. In 1977, after a New
York Constitutional amendment, the Court of Appeals was composed by the Governor's
appointment, with confirmation by the State Senate. See New York State Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction and History, at http://www4.law.com/ny/Courts/docs/cap/juris&hi/1847
cour.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).)
233. Judge John F. Scileppi served on the New York Court of Appeals from 1962 to
1972. Dan Fagin, J.F. Scileppi, Top State Court Judge, NEWSDAY, Nov. 30, 1987, at 29.
Prior to his election to the court, Scileppi served as Deputy State Attorney General and,
then, as a judge in Supreme Court in Queens County. Id.
234. Judge James Gibson served on the New York Court of Appeals from 1969 to 1978.
Bruce Lambert, James Gibson, 90, Former Judge on New York's High Court, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 1992, at B1O. Prior to his tenure on the court, Gibson served as District
Attorney of Washington County and a judge in both the Supreme Court and the Appellate
Division. Id.
235. Austin v. Loral, 29 N.Y.2d 124, 131 (1971).
236. Douglas Martin, Stanley Fuld, Former Judge, Is Dead at 99, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
2003, at A21.
[Vol. 2:2
REVISITING AUSTIN V. LORAL
a Columbia Law School classmate and then special prosecutor of rackets in
Manhattan, hired Fuld as an investigator.238  Fuld's specialty was
developing theories to prosecute racketeers and individuals with
connections to Tammany Hall.239 When Dewey was elected Manhattan
District Attorney, he appointed Fuld to head the Indictment Bureau and, in
1939, Fuld became chief of the Appeals Bureau.24° In 1942, after Dewey
became governor of New York, he supported Fuld's bid for a seat on the
Court of Appeals. 24' Fuld was the youngest person ever appointed to the
New York State Court of Appeals.242 Fuld also holds the record for longest
tenure on the Court of Appeals, having retired in 1973.243 Indeed, these
facts, among others, are why Chief Judge Judith Kaye observed that, "[t]o
write of Stanley Fuld is to write only in superlatives." 24
In Judge Fuld's some 28 years on the New York Court of Appeals, he
wrote more than 800 opinions,245 won an unwavering reputation as a
"consummate jurist,,246 and left an indelible mark on many areas of law,
including various aspects of contract law.247 Unsurprisingly, Judge Fuld's
majority opinion in Austin v. Loral is used as a main case in a majority of
Contracts casebooks.248
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. Chief Judge Fuld's background prosecuting mob bosses is interesting when placed
in contrast to Special Referee Aurelio's suspected connections to Tammany Hall; this is
especially so in light of Fuld's effective reversal of Aurelio's decision. See supra note 179.
240. Martin, supra note 235, at A21.
241. Id. See also Judith S. Kaye, Tribute to Judge Fuld, 104 COLuM. L. REv. 270 (2004).
242. Kaye, supra note, 241, at 270.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Martin, supra note 236, at A21.
246. Sidney Stein, Stanley H. Fuld: A Life Lived in the Law, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 258
(2004). See also Charles D. Breitel, Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1
(1974); Adrian P. Burke, Chief Judge H. Stanley Fuld, 71 COLuM. L. REv. 542 (1971);
William 0. Douglas, Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 531 (1971); Kenneth
R. Feinberg, New York's Court of Appeals and Stanley H. Fuld: An Appreciation, 48
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1477 (1998); Michael I. Sovem, Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 545 (1971); Jack B. Weinstein, The Honorable Stanley H. Fuld, THE HiST.
SOC'Y OF THE CTS. OF THE ST. OF N.Y., Vol. 1, No. 2, at 1 (Spring/Summer 2004).
247. Indeed, Judge Fuld averages 1.69 opinions as "main cases" (as opposed to "note
cases") in contracts casebooks. See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1380, 1462 (charting
contract casebooks that use Fuld's decisions as main cases).
248. Id. at 1462.
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Judge Fuld began the majority opinion in Austin v. Loral by noting that
there was no material disagreement concerning the facts or the law, and
reiterating the observation of Justice Steuer's dissent that the difficulty was
in the application of the law to the facts.249 In a footnote, the majority
noted that the issue was reviewable by the court because it was one of law,
not of fact.250 The court then framed the question as whether, "accepting
the facts found ... the courts below properly appl[ied] the law to them. '2 51
Addressing this question, the majority held that the Appellate Division did
not properly apply the law to the facts because "the evidence makes out a
classic case, as a matter of law, of ... duress. ' ' 52
First, the majority determined that Austin's threat (to stop deliveries
unless Loral agreed to the price increases) "deprived Loral of its free
will. ' '253  In this connection, the majority held that it was "perfectly
reasonable for Loral, or any other party similarly placed, to consider itself
in an emergency, duress situation., 254 The majority placed a great deal of
significance on the facts that Loral was dealing with the government, that
Loral needed the precision gears to meet its deadlines under the First
Government Contract and that Loral would suffer the consequences of the
default and liquidated damages clauses if it was delinquent in its
deliveries. 5  The court noted that, "Loral did a substantial portion of its
business with the Government, and it feared that a failure to deliver as
agreed upon would jeopardize its chances for future contracts. 2 56  The
majority did not give much credence to Austin's argument that Loral's
extensions of the delivery dates under the First Subcontract negated Loral's
claim that it direly needed the parts.257
The majority also rejected Austin's argument that Loral's claim of
economic duress was insufficient because Loral should have contacted the
government and asked for an extension of the delivery dates while Loral
249. 29N.Y.2dat 130.
250. Id. at 131, n. 5.
251. Id. (citing COHEN & KARGER, POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 492
(1952)).
252. Id. at 131.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. ("As bearing on this, Loral's relationship with the Government is most
significant.").
256. Id.
257. Id. at 132. The majority noted that a "Loral official" testified that the extensions
were a matter of formality and, in any event, when the deliveries were made, Loral had to
"work around the clock" to get the job done in time. Id.
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looked for a replacement vendor.258 The court noted that Loral could not be
certain when it would obtain the substitute parts, making it nearly impossible
to know how long of an extension it needed.259 The majority additionally
observed that "Loral was anxious to perform well in the Government's eyes"
and it "was producing a needed item of military hardware. 26°
Second, the court held that Loral had met its burden of demonstrating
that it could not obtain the precision gear parts from another source within
a reasonable time:
261
As Loral was producing a highly sophisticated item of military machinery
requiring parts made to the strictest engineering standards, it would be
unreasonable to hold that Loral should have gone to other vendors, with
whom it was either unfamiliar or dissatisfied, to procure the needed parts.
As Justice Steuer noted in his dissent, Loral "contacted all the
manufacturers whom it believed capable of making these parts," and this
was all the law requires.
262
Next, the majority held that the legal remedy in a suit against Austin
for breach of contract would have been inadequate under the circumstances
because Loral would still have had to procure the parts elsewhere and
would have suffered the consequences of the default and liquidated
damages provisions of the First Government Contract.263 Judge Fuld wrote
that "Loral actually had no choice, when the prices were raised by Austin,
except to take the gears at the 'coerced' prices and then sue to get the
excess back. '
264
Finally, the majority held that Loral promptly acted to make its duress
claim known because, had Loral made its claim known any sooner, it could
have faced another threat by Austin to stop deliveries-the very untenable
situation that influenced Loral to acquiesce in the first place. 265
Judge Bergan, 266 joined by Judges Breitel267 and Jasen, 268 wrote for the
dissent. The dissent saw the question before the court as one of fact which
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 133 (internal citation omitted).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266 Judge Francis Bergan served on the New York Court of Appeals from 1963 to 1972.
Wolfgang Saxon, Francis Bergan, 95, Ex-Judge; Shaped New York's Constitution, N.Y.
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"should not be open for resolution" by the Court of Appeals. 269 The dissent
began: "Whether acts constituting economic duress produce or do not
produce the damaging effect attributed to them is normally a routine type
of factual issue., 270 And, in this case, Judge Bergan noted that, "[w]hen the
testimony of the witnesses who actually took part in the negotiations for the
two disputing parties is examined, sharp conflicts of fact emerge."27'
The dissent stated that, on appeal, it was "needful to look at the facts
resolved in favor of Austin most favorably [to Austin.], 272 The dissent
commented that Austin was attempting to renegotiate the First Subcontract
and that it was not threatening Loral to stop deliveries under the First
Subcontract but, rather, requesting an accommodation while Austin's plant
was closed for vacation.
273
The dissent also observed that the "demonstration is replete in the
direct testimony of Austin's witnesses and on cross-examination of Loral's
principal and purchasing agent that the availability of practical alternatives
was a highly controverted issue of fact., 274 Because Austin asserted and
Loral admitted that there were many gear suppliers listed in the Thomas
Register, it was "at least a fair issue of fact whether under the
circumstances such conduct was reasonable and made what might
otherwise have been a commercially understandable renegotiation an
exercise of duress. 275
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1998, at B7. Prior to joining the court, Bergan served as a judge in the
Appellate Division and in four other lower courts. Id. Interestingly, Bergan went from high
school directly to Albany Law School; it was not until 1948, while serving as a State
Supreme Court Justice, that he received a bachelor's degree in Spanish. Paul Grondahl,
Judge Francis Bergan Dies at 95, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Mar. 24, 1998, at B 1.
267. Judge Charles D. Breitel was elected to the New York Court of Appeals in 1967; he
was elected Chief Judge in 1973; he retired in 1978. Eric Pace, Charles D. Breitel, Chief
Appeals Judge in 1970's, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1991, at B12. From 1934 to 1950, Breitel also
worked for Thomas E. Dewey when Dewey was New York City's special rackets prosecutor
and, then, Manhattan District Attorney. Id. From 1950 to 1973, Breitel served as a Supreme
Court Justice. Id. After his retirement from the Court of Appeals, Breitel was affiliated with
the Manhattan law firm Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn from 1978 to 1985. Id.
268. Judge Matthew J. Jasen was elected to the Court of Appeals in 1967 and retired in
1985. Historical Society of the Courts of New York, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/
Judges.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
269. Austin v. Loral, 29 N.Y.2d 124, 134 (1971).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 135.
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Austin sought leave to reargue, which the Court of Appeals denied. 76
277Austin and Loral never did business again.
IV. A STUDY IN FRAMING
In Austin v. Loral, the legal elements of a cause of action for economic
duress were not seriously contested by the parties or the courts. Rather, as
Justice Steuer observed, the heart of the dispute was in the application of
the principles of economic duress to the undisputed facts. 278  The
reconstructed story shows that the events leading to the modification of the
First Subcontract were largely undisputed; however, the parties provided
sharply contrasting characterizations of those events. Austin made efforts
to favorably characterize the facts; but presented within a frame of
economic duress, its characterization of the facts was not doctrinally
relevant. This part of the article explores the significance of issue framing.
Given the doctrinal differences between U.C.C. modification and common
law duress at the time of Austin v. Loral, a shift in Austin's framing of the
legal dispute might have changed the outcome in the Court of Appeals.
"Framing" describes the technique attorneys use to present the facts
and the law in terms most favorable to their clients.279 The same technique
has alternatively been described as "characterizing." 280 The idea of framing
276. Austin Instrument v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 749 (1971).
277. 6/23/05 Krauss Interview, supra note 51.
278. While there was disagreement among the judges concerning whether the
determinations were questions of law or fact, the sometimes-elusive line between law and
fact is a subject for an entirely separate article. It appears that the events were, for the most
part, unrefuted, but the dispute was in the characterization of those events. Perhaps the
question then becomes whether the choice between competing characterizations of
unrefuted occurrences is itself a question of law or fact.
279. See generally Jennifer Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Methodology for
Teaching and Learning Legal Reasoning, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249 (1986); see also Muriel
Morisey, Liberating Legal Education from the Judicial Model, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
213, 253-56 (2003) ("A primary goal in framing the issue will be anticipating and
reinforcing the client's legal arguments."); Kathryn Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How
Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103
DICK. L. REv. 7, 23-30 (1998) ("Framing or characterizing the issue in law is an extremely
important tool of advocacy because it dictates what facts are relevant, what law applies, and
who wins."); Jane B. Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Constructing the Field of
Professional Responsibility, 15 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 37, 63-68 (2001)
(discussing significance of technique of framing legal issues).
280. See generally Laura E. Little, Characterization and Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 372 (1996). This article uses the terms "characterizing" and "framing"
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is not new or novel; it is one of the bases of legal education and the practice
of law. Framing occurs at two general levels in any dispute.28  First, the
legal question is framed. Second, the answers to that question, or the facts,
are characterized to fit within the doctrinal framework of the question.
These two levels of framing do not necessarily occur in linear order-an
initial grasp of the facts will guide the formulation of the legal question
and, after its formulation, the legal question might warrant revision as the
facts become known.
282
The ability to "frame the legal issue" is among the basic skills that law
students develop to "think more like a lawyer." It is the process of defining
the parameters of a legal dispute in terms of a more doctrinally sustainable
theory based on the facts. Likewise, "characterizing the facts" is the
attorney's rhetorical process of presenting a client's perspective of a set of
circumstances.283
In Austin v. Loral, the parties perceived and, thus, characterized the
same events in a different manner. Austin took steps to characterize the
events as a matter of commercially understandable renegotiation, while
Loral took the steps to characterize the same set of circumstances as
coercive. Both sides made efforts to favorably characterize the facts;
however, Austin failed to frame the legal issue in a manner that made its
characterization of the facts doctrinally relevant. Tellingly, the market
shifts and Austin's losses under the First Subcontract were not even
mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision.284
interchangeably; though, it tends to use the term "framing" to describe the presentation of
the law and the term "characterizing" to describe the presentation of the facts.
281. See Little, supra note 280, at 376.
282. Parenthetically, there is an interesting connection between the stages of framing a
legal question and the discussion of how reducing a client's story to the fit it within the
limits of legal discourse can marginalize and ignore the narratives of minorities and poor
people. See generally Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narrative: The Critical
Perspective and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861
(1992); Stanchi, supra note 279. Another effect of legal framing can be that the attorney
gets locked into one frame of the legal question and, thereby, fails to uncover other facts that
could be relevant to another legal question with better frames the client's situation. See Kim
Scheppele, Foreward: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2097 (1989) (noting that
rules of legal relevance can limit evidence gathering).
283. See Little, supra note 280, at 376.
284. Moreover, it should be noted that the court's scope of review is limited to the legal
arguments raised by the parties; therefore, the Court of Appeals did not construct its own
frame for the dispute. See, e.g., Matter of Hoffbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 654 (1979) ("our
review is confined solely to the legal issues raised by the parties.").
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The legal technique of framing draws parallels to theories of cognitive
linguists. Cognitive linguists seek to understand the nature of language by
researching how the mind operates on an unconscious level.285 They
explore how we conceptualize our "everyday lives" and how we use
language to think and talk about concepts.286 Using this information,
cognitive linguists such as George Lakoff have theorized about "frames,"
or "mental structures which shape the way we see the world., 287
"Framing" can be described as the process of selectively packaging and
communicating concepts to fit what is already "instantiated" in the
synapses of our brains.288 In this context, framing can use what we know
about how our brains function to present concepts in a way that allows
favorable interpretations of facts and rules out unfavorable ones.289
Once a person is operating within a frame, she will only accept the
facts that fit within that frame. 290 "Reframing" is the process of using new
or different concepts to change the structures that shape how we see
things.291 Although the ideas of framing and refraining have been used by
cognitive linguists in academic circles for some time, they have only more
recently been popularly applied to the work of politicians in attempt to
control public opinion of political issues.29 2
In the political context, Lakoff provides the term "tax relief' as a
classic example of framing often used by political conservatives. 293 When
the word "relief' is used, taxation is metaphorically perceived as an
affliction, and the party trying to take away taxes is perceived as a hero.294
285. See LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 18, at 4. Cognitive linguists do not mean
the term "unconscious" in the Freudian sense of repressed ideas; rather, they use the term to
indicate "common sense reasoning" of which we are unaware. Id.
286. Id. at 3.
287. Id. at xv. A "frame" has also been described as any "system of concepts related in
such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in
which it fits." WILLIAM CROFT & ALAN D. CRUSE, COGNITIvE LINGUISTICS 15 (2004).
288. See LAKOFF, FRAME THE DEBATE, supra note 19, at 17.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 16-17. Lakoff states that ideas come in the form of frames and, when we have
frames available, words come readily. Id. 23-24. When the words do not come easily, it is
because we lack a simple, fixed frame to evoke the two or so words to describe the idea-
this is a phenomena described by cognitive linguists as "hypocognition." Id.
291. Id. at xv.
292 See generally id.; Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 17,
2005, at 38.
293. LAKOFF, FRAME THE DEBATE, supra note 19, at 4.
294. Id.
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Lakoff notes how, in response, political progressives began to use the
conservatives' term "tax relief' and, using the term, tried to argue against
it.295 He posits that this was a failure of progressives to reframe the issue
and that, by using the language of the conservatives' frame, the
progressives only ended up reinforcing that frame and the conclusion that
"tax relief' was needed.296 A parallel can be made to the legal techniques
of framing and what occurred in Austin v. Loral; rather than reframing the
issue as one of contract modification, Austin used Loral's frame of
economic duress and tried to refute it. By using Loral's frame of economic
duress, Austin served to reinforce that frame and lost the case at the Court
of Appeals.
Moreover, cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists have
recognized several biases in human decision-making,297 one of which is
that people make decisions based upon the way choices are framed.298 For
example, in one experiment, patients suffering from lung cancer were given
statistical information about the outcomes of two alternative medical
treatments, either surgery or radiation therapy. 299 Half of the patients were
presented with the choice of alternative treatments in terms of survival
rates, and the remaining patients were presented with the same choice
between treatments in terms of mortality rates.3 °0 When the choice
295. Id.
296. Id. at 4, 33.
297 See Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal
Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 783, 787-93 (2003). These "biases" are a wide range
of systematic errors that our minds commonly use to make decisions. Id.
298. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251 (1986) [hereinafter Rational Choice]; Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Sci. 453 (1981)
[hereinafter Psychology of Choice].
299. See Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 298; Tversky & Kahneman,
Psychology of Choice, supra note 298.
300. The patients were given statistical information about the outcomes of two
treatments. The same statistics were presented to two sets of patients, but one set received
the statistical information in terms of mortality rates and the other in terms of survival rates.
The following frames were presented to the patients:
Problem 1 (Survival Frame)
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 90 live through the post-operative period,
68 are alive at the end of the first year and 34 are alive at the end of five years.
Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy all live through
treatment, 77 are alive at the end of one year and 22 are alive at the end of five years.
Problem 2 (Mortality Frame)
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery, 10 people die during surgery or the post-
operative period, 32 die by the end of the first year and 66 die by the end of five years.
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between treatments was framed in terms of survival rates, significantly
fewer patients chose radiation than when that same choice was framed in
terms of mortality rates.30 1  This study demonstrated that different
representations of the same choice can lead decision makers to different
preferences. Behavioral economists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
have pointed to this study, among others, to question the rationality of
human decision-making and assess how we approach risk on a
psychological level.3°2
The studies also bear on judicial decision-making to the extent that
they underscore the significance of characterization. Indeed, if the same
event can be perceived in more than one way, 30 3 these studies emphasize
the importance of characterization in convincing the fact-finder of the
client's version of "what happened." In Austin v. Loral, both parties had
competing perceptions of the same events, and much of the dispute was in
convincing the judges to adopt one of the versions of the story. Loral
offered a view of the facts that fit more neatly within the legal frame
presented. This orderly package of facts and law likely appealed to the
judges that decided in Loral's favor.
Further, cognitive scientists have coined the term "frame blindness,"
which is described as "'setting out to solve the wrong problem because you
have, with little thought, created a mental framework for your decision that
causes you to overlook the best options or lose sight of important
objectives.' 30 4 The theory of frame blindness is relevant to the present
discussion because it might explain why Austin failed to reframe the issue
as one of contract modification. Although contract modification was a
Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy, none die during
treatment, 23 die by the end of one year and 78 die by the end of five years.
Rational Choice, supra note 298, at S254.
301. Under the survival frame, 18% of the patients chose radiation; under the mortality
frame, 44% of the patients chose radiation. Id. at S255. Tversky and Kahneman noted that
"[t]he advantage of radiation therapy over surgery evidently looms larger when stated as a
reduction of the risk of immediate death from 10% to 0% rather than an increase from 90%
to 100% in the rate of survival." Id.
302. See id.; Psychology of Choice, supra note 298. See also Joseph W. Rand,
Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad: Using Case Studies in Teaching Cognitive Bias
in Legal Decision-Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 731, 739 (2003); Weinstein, supra note 245.
303. See Little, supra note 280, at 376.
304. Rand, supra note 302, at 739 (quoting J. EDWARD Russo & PAUL J.H. SHOEMAKER,
DECISION TRAPS: THE TEN BARRIERS TO BRILLIANT DECISION-MAKING AND How TO
OVERCOME THEM 2 (1989)).
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plausible and available doctrinal framework, it could be that Austin set out
to disprove duress because this is the way Loral originally framed the
problem, blinding Austin to other ways to frame the issue.
Building upon the concepts of legal and cognitive framing, the
following sections of this article explicate the frames of economic duress
and contract modification at the time of Austin v. Loral. The doctrinal
differences between the two frames demonstrate why it would have been
more effective for Austin to reframe the dispute as one of contract
modification.
A. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF ECONOMIC DURESS
In Austin v. Loral, the courts and litigants agreed that economic duress
is demonstrated when A has forced B to enter into a contract by means of
an improper threat that precluded B from exercising its "free will."
Consistent with these common law parameters and the definition of duress
originally found in the First Restatement of Contracts, °5 scholars have
descriptively generalized the duress doctrine as a two-part inquiry.3 °6 One
part of the duress doctrine traditionally focuses on A's threat (the "proposal
prong"), and the second part assesses B's choices in the face of that threat
(the "choice prong").30 7 The choice prong generally looks to whether B's
"will" was "overborne" by A's threat.30 8 The proposal prong commonly
305. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492(b) (1932) provides that duress is:
[A]ny wrongful threat of one person by words or other conduct that induces
another to enter into a transaction under the influence of such fear as precludes
him from exercising free will and judgment, if the threat was intended or should
reasonably have been expected to operate as an inducement.
306. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 30 (1987) (discussing the two parts of the
analysis as the "choice prong" and the "proposal prong"). See also Mitchell Berman, The
Normative Functions of Coercive Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45, 46-49 (2002); Robert A.
Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of
Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REv. 849, 882 (1979) (describing two elements as "choice"
and "means" questions).
307. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 306, at 30. To be consistent with the terminology
used in the First and Second Restatements of Contracts, this article uses the term "threat" to
describe A's proposal. The term "threat" is not used to indicate a conclusion that A's
proposal was improper or coercive. The term "threat" is often used to indicate coercion, as
juxtaposed to the term "offer," which is intended to indicate the absence of coercion. Here,
the term "threat" is used more loosely, and, by simply using that terminology, the article
does not intend to convey the conclusion that A's (or Austin's) threat was improper or
coercive. See also Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 25, at 721 n.5 (explaining looser use
of term "threat" in analysis).
308. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 306, at 31-38 (discussing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 492(b)).
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asks whether A's threat was "wrongful., 30 9 Traditionally, if A's threat was
wrongful, and B's will was overborne, the contract is voidable at B's
option.
3 10
The proposal prong of duress jurisprudence attempts to determine
whether A's threat was wrongful-that is, whether it crossed the line from
a legal application of economic pressure to an illegal one.311  The
impropriety of A's threat has traditionally been assessed solely in terms of
the threat's effect on B, and without reference to A's reasons for making
the threat.312
From the instant Loral sent Austin the July 22, 1966 letter, Loral
framed the legal issue as one of economic duress. Likewise, Loral's brief
capitalized on the duress doctrine's focus on the state of mind of the person
alleged to be threatened.313 Austin did not reframe the legal issue; it only
presented competing characterizations of the facts. Loral's
characterizations of the facts could be summarized as follows:
Loral had stringent delivery requirements under the First Government
Contract and could not afford to pay liquidated damages for late deliveries
or to lose the government's business. The First Government Contract was
a substantial portion of Loral's business. Loral was concerned that its
deliveries to the government would be late because Austin's delinquencies
in delivering the gear parts had diminished Loral's "lead time." Austin,
capitalizing on Loral's vulnerability, threatened to stop production unless
309. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492(b); see also WERTHEIMER, supra note
306, at 38-46 (discussing inquiry as assessing whether "proposal" was "wrongful").
310. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492(b), supra note 309.
311. Notably, economic pressure is employed as a matter of business practice and is
inherent in varying degrees in any negotiation or offer to contract. Therefore, the line
between proper and improper economic pressure is obscure. Despite decades of scholarly
efforts to distinguish between coercive "threats" and noncoercive "offers," no unifying
theory has emerged. See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 25, at 719-20 (citing Robert
Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD 440, 458 (Sidney Morgenbesser,
et al. eds., 1969); Charles Fried, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 95-99 (1981); WERTHEIMER, supra
note 306, at 204-06; Peter Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion "-Virtue Words and Vice
Words, 1985 DuKE L.J. 541, 570-89 (1985)). See also John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-
An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REv. 253, 289 (1947) ("The history of generalization
in this field offers no great encouragement for those who seek to summarize results in any
single formula.").
312. Indeed, scholars have advocated for a shift in the focus of the general duress inquiry
to A's incentives in making the threat. See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 25 at 722;
Mather, supra note 24, at 626-28 (1982). See also discussion infra in Part VI.
313. Loral Main Br., supra note 65, at 14.
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Loral agreed to the price increases and other demands. Austin stopped
production in late-July. Loral called around to the eight vendors known to
it, but could not find a replacement supplier to provide the gear parts
quickly enough to make the delivery dates under the First Government
Contract. The gear parts were complex parts that few suppliers had the
capability to manufacture. Thus, Loral had no choice but to agree to the
price increases.
Austin's characterizations of the same facts could be summarized as
follows:
Austin did not threaten Loral to stop production but, rather, exerted an
ordinary amount of business pressure in attempt to renegotiate the deal.
Austin attempted to negotiate a better position after losing a lot of money
under the First Subcontract. The First Subcontract was a substantial
portion of Austin's production volume. Austin did not stop production in
late-July because of Loral's failure to acquiesce to the demands but,
rather, production slowed down because it was the beginning of Austin's
vacation period. Before Austin's plant shut down for a two-week
vacation, Krauss was simply trying to minimize Austin's losses by seeing
how much more Loral was willing to pay. Austin's gear parts were now
worth more due to the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam and they were
complex parts that few suppliers had the capability to manufacture. Loral,
a large, publicly held company, could have easily found another small
gear manufacturer who wanted to do business. Instead, it only called
eight potential replacement vendors and did not discuss pricing.
Loral's characterization of the story placed it squarely within the frame
of common law economic duress because it established that Austin's threat
was wrongful and Loral had no choice but acquiescence. The Court of
Appeals held as a matter of law that "a mere threat by one party to breach
the contract by not delivering the required items, though wrongful, does not
in itself constitute economic duress. 3 14 But the opinion then went on to
focus on the options available to Loral in response to Austin's threat, and it
appears that Loral's lack of options was what, in turn, made Austin's threat
wrongful.
Austin did not provide the Court of Appeals with a legal frame in
which the market shifts and its substantial losses under the First
Subcontract were doctrinally relevant. Focused solely on Loral's
predicament in the face of the threat, the Court of Appeals did not factor in
Austin's unfortunate circumstance. Austin's characterization of the story
was sympathetic within the economic duress frame, but its story fit more
314. Austin v. Loral, 29 N.Y.2d 124, 130 (1971).
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squarely within the language of a modification frame. Within the U.C.C.
modification frame, the "defense" of common law duress would not have
been available to Loral. Instead, Loral would only have been able to defeat
the modification by demonstrating that Austin acted in bad faith, which
would have at least made the market shifts and Austin's losses relevant to
the analysis.315
B. U.C.C. § 2-209 CONTRACT MODIFICATION
Contract modification under the U.C.C. does not expressly address
duress; instead, it looks to the good faith of the person requesting the
modification.316 The party requesting the modification is the threatening
party in an alleged duress situation, and the article will continue to refer to
this party as A. Unlike the economic duress doctrine, the good faith
inquiry, which is defined below, looks to A's reasons for making the threat
(or, request for modification).
In adopting U.C.C. § 2-209, the drafters abandoned the traditional pre-
existing duty rule, which required additional consideration to modify a
contract. 3 17 U.C.C. § 2-209(1) provides that "an agreement modifying a
contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding. 318
U.C.C. § 2-209(1) does not expressly address the exercise of economic
duress in the modification of a contract and does not mention the problem
of "overreaching by a contracting party. 3 19 It does, however, provide in
the comments that the request for the modification must meet the "test of
good faith . . .and the extortion of a 'modification' without legitimate
commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith. 32°
The drafters likely intended the broad requirement of "good faith" to fill
the "gap" left by the omission of reference to duress.321
315. See, e.g., Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 145 (6th Cir. 1983)
("The ability of a party to modify a contract which is subject to Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code is broader than common law, primarily because the modification needs
no consideration to be binding .... A party's ability to modify an agreement is limited only
by Article Two's general obligation of good faith.").
316. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (2003).
317. Id. § 2-209 cmt. 1 ; see also Hillman, supra note 306, at 851-55.
318. § 2-209(1).
319. Hillman, supra note 306, at 850.
320. § 2-209 cmt. 2; see also Mather, supra note 24, at 617; Hillman, supra note 306, at 856.
321. Hillman, supra note 306, at 849 (stating that drafters apparently thought that the
good faith requirement would protect against overreaching in contract modification).
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The comments to Section 2-209 provide that "the test of 'good faith'
between merchants or as against merchants includes 'observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade,"' and
reference Section 2-103(l)(b). 322 Under Section 2-103(l)(b), "good faith"
for purposes of Article 2 is defined as "honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. 323 The
comments to U.C.C. Section 2-209 specifically provide that the "test of
good faith" between merchants or as against merchants "may in some
situations require an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a
modification. '" 324 Relevant to the reconstructed story of Austin v. Loral, the
comments also state that "matters such as a market shift which makes
performance come to involve a loss" may provide an "objectively
demonstrable reason" for requesting the modification.325
Professor Henry Mather has distilled the components of the Section 2-
103 definition of "good faith" down to two requirements: "(1) the party
requesting the amendment must have a legitimate commercial reason for
requesting the amendment; and (2) the amendment terms must be fair when
viewed in the context of that legitimate commercial reason and in light of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. 326
Had Austin refrained the case as one of contract modification, it would
have employed different language to describe what happened. Austin
would not have been describing its action as a "threat" or "demand;"
instead, it would have been using the more temperate language of the
modification frame: "request." Moreover, the market shifts and Austin's
significant losses would have been relevant to the doctrinal frame.
3 27
322 § 2-209 cmt. 2. The definition of "merchant" is found in U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
Professor Robert Hillman pointed out that "good faith" in the context of a contract
modification may also be defined by Section 1-201(20) of the Code, which is not limited to
merchants. Hillman, supra note 306, at 856 (referencing pre-2003 revision Section 1-
201(19)). Section 1-201(20) provides more generally that "good faith" means "honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 1-
201(20) . Cf pre-revision Section 1-201(19) requiring "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (pre-2003 revision). Thus, the Code requires
more of merchants-it requires honesty in fact and, additionally, commercial
reasonableness.
323. § 2-103(b).
324. § 2-209 cmt. 2.
325. Id.
326. Mather, supra note 24, at 618.
327. Austin did mention peripherally New York General Obligations Law section
5-1103, which, akin to U.C.C. section 2-209, provides that a contract modification
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Within the modification frame, Austin had a ready-made argument that the
market increases were a commercially legitimate reason to request
modification of the First Subcontract and, thus, made in good faith. While
the U.C.C. does not address duress, at least the Court of Appeals would
have been presented with a doctrinal frame in which to view Austin's
significant losses. Indeed, the Appellate Division majority was inclined to
view the facts in this light and, even absent the presentation of the doctrinal
frame of contract modification, the Appellate Division majority mentioned
that Austin appeared to be acting in "good faith. 328
V. TOWARD A GOOD FAITH INQUIRY
The study of the modification and duress frames in the context of
Austin v. Loral elucidates the recent debate concerning the doctrine of
economic duress. The study suggests that the duress doctrine should be
restated as a good faith inquiry in the contract modification context.
Indeed, rather than refraining the legal issue, Loral could have argued for a
more sensible duress doctrine that did not solely focus on B's lack of
choices.
This part of the article assesses certain critiques of the choice prong of
economic duress in the context of the reconstructed story of Austin v.
Loral. It then addresses the modification and duress provisions under the
Second Restatement of Contracts, which were not in existence at the time
of Austin v. Loral. Finally, based upon the addition of the definition of
"improper threat" under the Second Restatement and strong critiques of the
choice prong of the doctrine, the article proposes that, in the context of
contract modification, the duress inquiry solely ask whether A can be said
to have acted in good faith in seeking the modification.
does not require consideration to be binding so long as the modification is in writing
and signed by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced. Austin argued
tangentially that section 5-1103 "is a recognition of the fact that there are many
reasons, both business and moral, why contracts are amended in what might at first
blush appear to be a one-sided fashion." Austin Br., supra note 50, at 25-26. Thus,
Austin did not frame the case in a contract modification paradigm, but did attempt to
use section 5-1103 to underscore the innocent reasons for its demands. Notably,
section 5-1103 does not mention duress or the test of good faith. See N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-1103 (McKinney 1963).
328. Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 316 N.Y.S.2d 528, 532 (App. Div. 1970).
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A. A CRITIQUE OF THE CHOICE PRONG OF ECONOMIC DURESS
There are strong arguments that the traditional "free will" inquiry
employed in the choice prong of economic duress does not describe our
current understanding of the situation B faces.32 9 Scholars have argued that
the idea that B lacks "free will" in the face of A's threat is an "artificial
construct, '330 especially when A's proposal is not a physical threat and B is
a volitional, corporate actor.
In response to A's threat, B is faced with a choice between two
alternatives: either (1) surrender to the threat or (2) refuse to surrender to
the threat and face the adverse consequences of that refusal.3 1  B is
"presented with unwanted, unpleasant alternatives, but is free to choose and
act upon the least obnoxious of them., 332 In this connection, Professor
Grace Giesel argues that the modern duress paradigm is not about the
absence of B's "free will" but, rather, a situation of "constrained choice. 333
Rather than engage in a metaphysical debate concerning the definition of
"free will," and how that might differ from a situation of "constrained
choice," this article will simply point out that the term "free will" does not
seem to align with how we conceptualize the duress situation-it no longer
befits modern sensibilities to use "free will" language to frame the inquiry.
The unsuitability of the "free will" frame is exemplified by Loral's
struggle to articulate an argument that its "will" was "overborne." When
Austin threatened to stop production of the gear parts, Loral essentially
faced two choices. First, Loral could refuse to surrender to the threat and
terminate the First Subcontract with Austin. This option was unattractive
because, as Frohmann (Loral's Manager of Operations) testified, Loral
329. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 306, at 33-36; Giesel, supra note 14, at 445-46; P.S.
Atiyah, Economic Duress and the 'Overborne Will', 98 L. Q. REv. 197, 201 (1982) ("[T]he
'overborne will' theory should now be consigned to the historical scrapheap.").
330. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 306, at 33.
331. Giesel, supra note 14, at 446; Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 25, at 718.
332. Michael Philips, Are Coerced Agreements Involuntary?, 3 LAW & PiL. 133, 134
(1984); see also Giesel, supra note 14, at 472 ("As long as the bargainer chooses between
options by means of rational thought, the bargainer exercises free will."); see also
WERTHEIMER, supra note 306, at 33 ("For even in the paradigm cases of duress, the party
who acts under duress is engaged in a volitional and rational action."); Atiyah, supra note
328, at 201 ("A rule which declares that it only operates when a person has no choice, but
then requires examination of the choices open to him, does not inspire confidence among
rational beings.").
333. Giesel, supra note 14, at 448; see also John Dalzell, Duress By Economic Pressure,
20 N.C. L. REV. 237, 238 (1942); Philips, supra note 331, at 134 ("[B] is a victim of
imposed conditions of choice, but still he may choose.").
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would not have enough lead time to manufacture the radar sets. Second,
Loral could surrender to Austin's threat, pay the price increases and agree
to award all forty parts under the Second Subcontract. This option was also
unattractive to Loral because it meant paying more than it originally agreed
for the same parts under the First Subcontract, and awarding Austin the
Second Subcontract for items on which Austin was not the lowest bidder.
Frohmann also mentioned a hybrid of the two options, which was to
temporarily acquiesce to the threat and continue the First Subcontract with
Austin while simultaneously entering into another subcontract for the parts
with another supplier.334 This way, Loral would have the gear parts
(though, for the higher price) during the twelve to fourteen weeks it would
take for the new supplier to begin making deliveries. This option was also
unsatisfactory because it would leave Loral paying for and receiving a
surplus of gear parts.335
Faced with these "unsatisfactory" choices, Loral made a measured
decision to agree to the price increases and Austin's other demands. In its
brief to the New York Court of Appeals, Loral argued:
What [Loral] did, as "a matter of business judgment" was to decide not to
commit economic suicide and nothing more. Can this court really believe
that [Loral's] submission to [Austin's] coercive demands was made in the
exercise of its free will; any more than a hold-up victim with a gun to his
head can be said to part with his wallet voluntarily, simply because he
recognizes the utter futility of further protestations.
336
Even after characterizing its acquiescence as a matter of business
judgment, Loral strained to describe the situation as an absence of its "free
will."
337
334. Record, supra note 51, at 483-84 (Frohmann Tr.).
335. Id.
336. Loral Main Br., supra note 65, at 44.
337. Loral argued nonsensically that other cases had recognized "[t]he myriad
manifestations of the 'voluntary' nature of involuntary payments." Id. (citing
Kilpatrick v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 153 N.Y. 163 (1897) and Adams v. Irving Nat'l
Bank, 116 N.Y. 608 (1889)). This argument is puzzling because Loral was
attempting to force its version of the facts into the confines of an unsuitable "free
will" frame. While this article does not addresss the metaphysical debate over what
may or may not be an exercise of "free will," it is worth noting that Professor Giesel
questions whether a corporation can be said to have "free will." Giesel, supra note
14, at 473 ("A free will test is particularly useless, and particularly ridiculous, when
the free will in question is that of an entity such as a corporation.").
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In place of the "free will" terminology, Professor Giesel advocates for
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175(1) inquiry. The Second
Restatement asks whether B had "no reasonable alternative" to
surrendering to A's threat.338 The Second Restatement adopted this "no
reasonable alternative" inquiry in substitution of the "free will" analysis
used in the First Restatement because of the "vagueness and
impracticality" 339 of the "free will" approach.
Austin v. Loral exemplifies why the "no reasonable alternative" test
better aligns with how we conceptualize the issue of duress. Because Loral
chose acquiescence to Austin's threat as a matter of business judgment, the
question is more aptly whether Loral had any reasonable alternative to this
choice. Indeed, although phrased as a "free will" inquiry, it appears that
the Appellate Division and New York Court of Appeals actually framed the
question as whether Loral had any reasonable alternative to acquiescence.
Although the Court of Appeals nominally held that Austin "deprived Loral
of its free will, 3 40 the court supported this conclusion with the
determination that "Loral actually had no choice . . . except to take the
gears at the 'coerced' price and then sue to get the excess back." 341
Presumably, the Court of Appeals did not mean that Loral had "no choice"
in a literal sense.342
Noticeably, however, "it does not follow" that a "no reasonable
alternative" inquiry is "easily or always correctly applied. '3 43 For example,
in Austin v. Loral, the courts were closely divided concerning whether
Loral made reasonable efforts to obtain a replacement vendor to supply the
gear parts. There was discernable disagreement among the judges whether
Loral's eight phone calls was sufficient effort to procure a replacement
vendor, which has direct bearing on whether Loral had any alternatives to
338. Giesel, supra note 14, at 448.
339. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. b (1981); see also Giesel, supra
note 14, at 459-60.
340. Austin v. Loral, 29 N.Y.2d 124, 131 (1971).
341. Id. at 133.
342. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 306, at 35. Wertheimer notes:
Now it is obvious that in some sense, Loral had a choice-it could have defaulted under
the Navy contract and sued Austin for breach of contract. But the court understood that "no
choice" should not be taken literally. It did not mean that it was logically or psychologically
impossible for Loral to have done otherwise or that Loral had been driven to undertake
some irrational action. It meant that Loral had had "no reasonable choice" or "no
acceptable alternative."
(emphasis in original) (footnotes in original omitted).
343. Id. at 37.
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acquiescence. In light of the closeness of this inquiry alone, the difficulty
in applying the "no reasonable alternative" test is apparent.
Most importantly, however, it seems that the traditional common law
focus on B's options is itself misguided. It has been suggested that this
inquiry is redundant because, if B had another, reasonable option, B would
not have surrendered to A's threat and would have simply sued for breach
of contract.344 The very fact that B has surrendered suggests that, at least
from B's perspective, it had no reasonable alternative to acquiescence.
This was certainly the case from Loral's vantage point.
Thus, although the "no reasonable alternative" test is perhaps a better
articulation of how we conceptualize the choice prong of the duress
doctrine, the choice prong is misguided because it is redundant of B's
efforts in claiming economic duress.
B. THE SECOND RESTATEMENT APPROACH TO MODIFICATION AND DURESS
The Second Restatement of Contracts had not yet been adopted at the
time of Austin v. Loral.345 Nevertheless, it is important to note the Second
Restatement's changes to the definition of duress and its treatment of
contract modification.
Section 175 of the Second Restatement defines economic duress, and
essentially sets forth the proposal and choice prongs already outlined, with
some language changes: (1) A makes an "improper threat" that (2) leaves
B with "no reasonable alternative" and, thus, induces B to surrender to A's
threat.346 Unlike the First Restatement, Section 176 of the Second
Restatement sets out to define an "improper threat., 347 Section 176(l)(d)
344. Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar suggest that the requirements that B had no reasonable
alternative to surrendering to the threat and that B had no adequate remedy are redundant to
the extent that B would not have acquiesced if a reasonable alternative or remedy existed.
See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible
Threats, 33 J. LEGAL STuD. 391, 393 (2004) ("Duress jurisprudence, which focuses on the
availability of 'reasonable alternatives' and on the adequacy of remedies, is misguided if
only because it is redundant: if the threatened party had adequate alternatives or fully
compensatory remedies, she would not have surrendered to the threat.").
345. The Second Restatement of Contracts was "adopted and promulgated" by the
American Law Institute on May 17th, 1979. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
VII (1981).
346. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) provides:
If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party
that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 provides that:
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identifies "a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a
contract" as one example.348 In defining a breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing under Section 176(1)(d), the Restatement comments quote
verbatim much of the good faith analysis in the comments to U.C.C.
section 2-209. The comments also refer to the contract modification
paradigm under section 89.
Second Restatement section 89 addresses modifications of executory
contracts and, like the U.C.C., does not require consideration for the
modification to be enforceable.349 Section 89(a) provides that "[a] promise
modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is
binding if ... the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances
not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made. 35°
Like the U.C.C., Restatement section 89 does not expressly mention
duress, but the comments state that "[t]he limitation to a modification
which is 'fair and equitable' goes beyond absence of coercion and requires
an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification., 35' As
Professor Mather explains, section 89(a) essentially distills to two
requirements for a modification to be enforceable: "(1) the reason for the
amendment must relate to circumstances not anticipated when the original
contract was formed; and (2) the amendment must be fair and equitable. 352
Professor Mather additionally notes that it appears that the modification
must be fair in particular relation to the circumstances that justify it.3 53
(1) A threat is improper if
(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would be a crime or a
tort if it resulted in obtaining property,
(b) what is threatened is a criminal prosecution,
(c) what is threatened is the use of civil process and the threat is made in bad faith, or
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a contract
with the recipient.
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit
the party making the threat,
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent is
significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat, or
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.
348. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(1)(d) (1981).
349. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (1981).
350. Id.
351. Moreover, this provision has been interpreted as prohibiting modifications obtained
by duress. See, e.g, Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 636 (1974).
352. Mather, supra note 24, at 619.
353. Id. at 620.
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Thus, although Restatement section 89(a) does not use the U.C.C.'s term
"good faith," the requirements of the comments appear to collapse into to
the same rough definitional components.354
Thus, the section 176 comments define an "improper threat" for duress
purposes by incorporating a good faith analysis from U.C.C. section 2-209
and referencing the modification inquiry under Restatement section 89.
Accordingly, in the context of a contract modification, the economic duress
inquiry under the Second Restatement is essentially: (1) the choice prong
of common law duress and (2) a good faith inquiry. Given the redundancy
of the choice prong, it seems that, to determine whether duress induced B
to modify a contract, the inquiry should solely be whether A could be said
to have made the threat in good faith.355
C. APPLICATION OF A GOOD FAITH INQUIRY
A good faith analysis would abandon the inquiry into B's choices, and
solely look to whether A's threat (or request for modification) was made in
good faith.356 A good faith inquiry remains broad and flexible.357 It also
354. Id. ("[R]eformulated, the Restatement section 89(a) bears striking
resemblance to that derived from section 2-209(1) of the UCC."). Although Section
89 does not use the U.C.C. term "good faith," it appears to intend to address many of
the same circumstances-such as, for example, market shifts-and, therefore, the
two provisions likely overlap substantially if not entirely. See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 1
(2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 cmt. b, Illus. 4 (1981).
355. Indeed, the prevailing theory of the proposal prong is that a threat to breach a
contract is not itself improper for the purposes of duress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. e (1981); see also E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.17 (2d
ed. 1990); JOHN E. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 93 (3d ed. 1990). Professor Jason Scott
Johnston notes that, "since a threat to breach is not per se improper, it can only be the
circumstances surrounding the threat that make it improper." Johnston, supra note 15, at
384. Because the duress inquiry looks to the circumstances surrounding the threat, he
argues that the duress inquiry collapses into one of good faith. Id. Under the Second
Restatement, the question does appear to partially collapse into a good faith inquiry;
however, under the present formulation, it still retains an assessment of B's choices.
356. Duress is usually thought to be an affirmative defense. To the extent that a
defendant raises duress as a defense, the burden would be on that defendant to demonstrate
that it acted in good faith in seeking the modification. Moreover, in the situation where
duress is used offensively - as a cause of action rather than a defense - the plaintiff would
have the burden to establish that the defendant acted in bad faith in seeking the
modification. In this context, there is no need for the choice prong to remain part of the
inquiry solely for the purpose of a burden-shifting paradigm. In other words, the plaintiff
need not first show that it had no reasonable alternative, with the burden of proof then
shifting to the defendant to show the modification request was in good faith. Instead, the
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provides a ready-made frame that takes into account A's reasons for
making the threat. Indeed, as much as Austin failed to frame the issue in
terms of modification, because the duress inquiry did not look to Austin's
circumstances, the duress doctrine failed Austin.
In the contract modification context, good faith can be said to mean
that: (1) A had a commercially legitimate reason for requesting the
modification and (2) the resulting modification is fair when viewed in
relation to that legitimate commercial reason.358 Though the good faith
inquiry has been criticized as too broad, it has also been commended for its
flexibility. 359 Moreover, the good faith inquiry can be made less vague or
overbroad by referring to suggested factors to be used in the determination
of A's good faith.
One such suggested factor is considering (from A's standpoint) A's
economic incentives in making the threat. 360 For example, in a few recent
articles, 361 Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar propose a
"credible coercion" doctrine that focuses on A's economic incentives in
initial burden should be on the plaintiff to show that the defendant's request for a
modification was in bad faith.
357. Hillman, supra note 306, at 877-78.
358. It should additionally be noted that, in 1979, Professor Hillman argued that the
courts addressing contract modifications under the Code "have developed no clear definition
of good faith." Hillman, supra note 306, at 862. However, the courts have since set "basic
parameters." See generally Johnston, supra note 15, at 378-80 (discussing Roth Steel
Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983) and T&S Brass & Bronze
Works, Inc. v. Pic-Air, Inc., 790 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1986)). The case law shows that
"courts have scrutinized the record to find evidence that the modification was not an
extortionate attempt to gain a windfall, but rather was motivated by a 'precipitous market
change,' such as seller cost increase, the discovery that costs were higher than anticipated,
or a fall in demand below projected levels." Johnston, supra note 15, at 380. Conversely,
"[c]ourts have found bad faith modification when the evidence has indicated that the reasons
advanced for the modification request were a mere pretext." Id. Thus, Professor Hillman's
concern that the Code does not provide enough guidance in defining "good faith" appears
allayed by intervening judicial opinions.
359. Hillman, supra note 306, at 877-78. Professor Hillman noted that the broadness of the
notion of good faith was both a strength and weakness of the Code. Id The flexibility allows
for an individualized assessment of the various types of circumstances that might arise. Id.
The broadness of this approach does, however, allow for the potential of decisions based on
individual values and beliefs, with absence of uniformity among them. Id.
360. See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 25; Mather, supra note 24.
361. Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, supra note 25; Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar,
The Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible Threats, supra note 343; see also Oren
Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Threatening an "Irrational" Breach of Contract, 11 Sup. CT.
ECON. REv. 143 (2004).
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362making the threat without reference to whether A coerced B's assent.
Under this theory, a threat is credible if A intends to carry it out-in other
words, a threat is credible when it "would be in the interest of the
,0363threatening party to bring about the threatened outcome. A credible
threat is to be distinguished from a bluff, which is a threat that A does not
intend to carry out.
3 64
Stated in economic terms, A's threat is credible if A's payoff from
carrying out the threat exceeds A's payoff from not carrying it out.3 65 This
doctrine of coercion looks to the credibility of A's threat as "the single
decisive factor" whether B is entitled to a remedy based upon duress.366
The analysis solely considers the credibility of A's threat in economic
terms, and does not purport to determine whether A was overreaching or
acting opportunistically.367 If A's threat is credible, the agreement that
results from the threat should be enforced.368
Though seemingly counterintuitive, this theory is based upon the
premise that, when A's threat is credible, B is economically better off with
an enforceable contract.369 B is also better off because, if A thinks its threat
will make the resulting contract voidable at B's option, A might not make
the threat at all.37 °  Ironically, this would leave B with fewer options
than if the resulting deal would be enforceable.37'
362. Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 25, at 721.
363. Id. at 718.
364. Id. at 721.
365. Id. at 722. Under this economic analysis, the threat is essentially credible if A's
threatened breach of contract would be efficient. See Joseph M. Perillo, CALAMARI AND
PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, at 619-620 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing efficient breach theory).
366. Id. at 721.
367. Id. at 742 ("[C]redible coercion criterion does not purport to answer whether an act
is coercive or whether it was morally wrong. It is wholly possible that an act of coercion
could be both credible and morally wrong.").
368. Id. at 720.
369. Id. at 718.
370. Id. at 719. For example, if Austin thought the modification resulting from its threat
would not be enforceable under a duress theory, Austin might not make the threat at all.
Instead of making the threat, Austin might simply breach. This would leave Loral with
fewer options than if Loral believed the resulting contract would be enforceable.
371. Id.
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Application of the credible coercion analysis to Austin v. Loral might
lead to a different outcome than the Court of Appeals decision.31 2  It
appears that Austin's threat to stop delivery of the precision gear parts was
credible in the sense defined by Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar. The cost of
Austin's labor and materials had increased and the market demand for its
precision gear parts had risen substantially due the conflict in Vietnam.
Between Austin's price quote in response to Loral's first RFQ and the time
of Austin's threat, the market prices for each of Austin's gear parts had
increased between 30% and 150%. At the time of Austin's threat, it had
already lost over $70,000 on the First Subcontract, and this subcontract was
a substantial portion of Austin's production volume. Given these
exogenous 373 market changes, it was likely in Austin's economic interest to
stop delivery of the gear parts altogether.
Unless Austin could secure more money for the gear parts, it was likely
better off breaching the First Subcontract than continuing to perform at a
significant loss. Assuming (as the testimony shows) that the price
increases Austin demanded under the First Subcontract reflected increases
in the market value of the gear parts, Loral's replacement costs for the
undelivered gears would likely have been around $19,264 (the amount
Austin demanded in prospective price increases).374 Loral did not argue
that it could not have found a replacement vendor to supply the gear parts;
rather, Loral testified that it could not find a vendor to supply the gear parts
in time for Loral to meet the delivery dates under the First Government
Contract. In this connection, Loral's replacement costs (the difference
between the prices under the First Subcontract and the prices under a
contract with a replacement vendor) would likely reflect the market
increase of roughly $19,000.
However, the credibility of Austin's threat is not entirely certain
because it is not clear whether Austin's breach would have made it liable
for more than Loral's replacement costs. If Loral could not obtain a
372. Id. at 755 (discussing opposite outcome in Austin v. Loral under credible coercion
analysis, but noting that it is not possible to determine on the facts provided in the appellate
decisions).
373. Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar describe circumstances such as market shifts, which A had
no hand in creating, as "exogenously credible." In this situation, credibility is the
inadvertent result of circumstances beyond A's control, not the result of A's deliberate
choice. Id. at 732.
374. This figure does not include the amount Austin demanded in retroactive increases
because these increases were for parts already delivered and, therefore, Loral presumably
did not need these parts from substitute vendor.
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replacement vendor to supply the gear parts in time to make its deliveries
under the First Government Contract, Loral would likely suffer the
consequences of the default and liquidated damages clauses. Austin would
be liable to Loral for these losses only if they were foreseeable
consequences of Austin's breach of the First Subcontract.375
It is not clear from the record whether Austin was aware of the
liquidated damages and default provisions under the First Government
Contract when it entered into the First Subcontract with Loral. The
purchase orders that constituted the First Subcontract did not mention these
provisions of the First Government Contract. Loral attempted to establish
that such provisions were common to government contracts and Austin, as
a government subcontractor, was aware of the provisions generally. 376 Yet,
it is not certain from the testimony whether Austin was actually aware of
the terms of the First Government Contract. The credibility of Austin's
threat appears to hinge upon whether it was aware of the liquidated
damages and default provisions.
If Austin was not aware of these provisions, and Loral's losses under
the liquidated damages and default provisions were not otherwise a
foreseeable consequence of breach, Austin's threat is more likely credible.
In this scenario, Austin's breach could cause it to owe Loral roughly
$19,000 in Loral's replacement costs. But, because the market had
changed substantially, Austin could make up this difference by simply
entering into a new contract to supply gear parts to another manufacturer at
the then-market rates.
375. "[D]amages are recoverable only for those injuries that the defendant had reason to
foresee as a probable result of his breach when the contract was made." 11-56 CORBrN ON
CONTRACTS § 1007 (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854) ("Where two parties
have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party
ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and
reasonably be considered either arising naturally; i.e., according to the usual course of
things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have
been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable
result of the breach.")).
376. Record, supra note 51, at 32-39 (Loral's attorney attempted to establish that Austin
was generally aware of the ASPR regulations common to all government contracts).
377. Notably, however, this analysis assigns no economic value to Austin's continued
business relationship with Loral. In other words, this analysis does not take into account the
disruption that Austin's breach would cause in ongoing relations with Loral but, rather,
assumes that Austin is "better off' breaching the existing contract than absorbing its present
losses in hopes of future, profitable contracts flowing from a continued business relationship
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However, if Austin was aware of the provisions, and Loral's losses
under these provisions were a foreseeable consequence of breach at the
time the parties entered into the First Subcontract, Austin could be liable to
Loral for extensive damages as a result of a breach of the subcontract. In
this scenario, it is less likely that Austin's threat would be credible, because
its payoff from walking away from the First Subcontract must also take
into account compensation for Loral's losses under the liquidated damages
and default provisions. Indeed, Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill's analysis notes
that an increase in liability for breach of contract diminishes the credibility
of the threat.378
In sum, under Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar's proposed analysis, Austin's
threat appears to have been credible; 379 however, this determination cannot
be certain without more information pertaining to the foreseeability to Austin
of Loral's potential liability for delinquency under the First Government
Contract. Under this analysis, if Austin's threat was credible, the resulting
price increases under the First Subcontract would be enforced. 380
with Loral. See Perillo, supra note 365, at 620 (noting disruption of ongoing business
relations when a party breaches a contract).
378. Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 25, at 735.
379. In light of the existing doctrine of duress, Austin did not build a case that its threat
was credible. Austin's first line of defense was that it did not make any threat at all but,
rather, simply sought to renegotiate the First Subcontract. Even assuming Austin made the
threat, Austin essentially argued that it was not a threat it ever intended to carry out. Krauss
testified:
I could never stop production of anything, because there are all engineering items
made from a piece of steel to a specification of a customer, which we are unable to
sell, even for the scrap value of the material, which is, in some cases, even 2 per
cent or 5 per cent of the cost of the whole item, and it cannot be used for anything
but for that customer and that particular job.
Record, supra note 51, at 554 (Krauss Tr.). Of course, under a doctrinal shift to a
credibility analysis, Austin would want to build a case arguing just the opposite: Austin's
material and labor costs increased and, if Loral wouldn't pay more for the gear parts, it
made economic sense for Austin to carry out this threat.
380. One aspect of this result that does not seem equitable is the ripple affect on Loral's
contract with the Navy. While it might make sense to enforce a modification that would
otherwise have resulted in Austin's efficient breach of the original subcontract with Loral,
the result would leave Loral in a precarious situation with the Navy. Unless the Navy was
willing to modify the prime contracts with Loral, Loral would suffer losses due to the same
market shifts that precipitated Austin's requests for modifications of the subcontracts. If the
Navy would not agree to modify the prime contracts (or Loral was just not in a position to
make such requests), Loral would suffer losses due to the market shift. However, if the
Navy agreed to modify the contracts with Loral, the market shifts (and Austin's losses)
would essentially be passed on to the Navy. In this connection, it is worth noting that there
[Vol. 2:2
REVISITING AUSTIN V. LORAL
Notably, the credibility analysis measures whether B is better off from
a post-threat baseline-that is, whether B is better off with an enforceable
deal as measured after A's threat is made.8 When A's threat is credible, it
makes sense to measure B's position from a post-threat baseline because A
will likely carry out the threat whether or not B surrenders. This premise
may be exemplified by the reconstructed story of Austin v. Loral.
Measuring Loral's position from a post-threat baseline, Loral is better off
with an enforceable, modified First Subcontract. Measuring from a post-
threat baseline makes sense because, if Austin's threat was credible, Austin
was going to breach the First Subcontract anyway. If Austin was going to
breach the First Subcontract whether or not Loral acceded to the threats to
stop production, Loral' s pre-threat expectation of the lower prices under the
original First Subcontract had become academic. Actually, both parties
would end up in a better position with an enforceable modification because
Austin would counteract its losses under the First Subcontract and Loral
would be able to deliver the parts to the government on time. Moreover,
enforcing a deal that results from a credible threat prevents the situation
where Austin does not bother to make the threat but, rather, simply
breaches because it thinks that the resulting modification will not be
enforceable under the duress doctrine.
Although Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill present credibility as the sole factor
to determine whether to enforce a coercive contract, credibility is potentially
one suggested factor in a good faith analysis, especially to the extent a good
faith analysis assesses whether A had a commercially legitimate reason for
the modification request. 382 The other piece of good faith-whether the
resulting modification is fair when viewed in relation to the legitimate
commercial reason-is not addressed by a straight economic inquiry.
383
Perhaps the fairness of the modification can be assessed in terms of A's
payoff for walking away from the original deal-that is, the fairness of the
modification would be measured in relation to the amount that makes the
was not any indication in the record whether the Navy required a bond to ensure against
Loral's failure to perform its obligations under the First and Second Government Contracts.
381. Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 25, at 743-44.
382. Indeed, the limitations of a straight economic analysis are, perhaps, best exemplified
by the cognitive framing theories, which challenge the assumption that humans are rational
decision-makers. See, Part IV, infra.
383. See Mather, supra note 24, at 648 ("Although economic analysis indicates that
certain allocations are efficient, it cannot determine which of these efficient allocations are
equitable.").
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modification, rather than a breach of the original contract, worthwhile for
A.384 In other words, the request for a $1,000 price modification based
upon a $10 market increase would not likely be fair in relation to the
market shift that justifies the request for the modification. 385
This fairness principal is perhaps exemplified by the Second
Subcontract in Austin v. Loral. Austin threatened to stop production unless
Loral acquiesced to three demands. Austin's first two demands were for
retroactive and prospective price increases on the First Subcontract. The
third demand, however, was for an award of all forty gear parts under the
Second Subcontract even though Austin was the lowest bidder on only
twenty-three of those parts. The courts mentioned Austin's third demand
for all forty parts in a Second Subcontract, but did not focus on this demand
because Loral only claimed coercion in relation to the First Subcontract.386
It appears, however, that, under the traditional criteria, Loral had a viable
claim for coercion as to the Second Subcontract as well-Loral only agreed
to award Austin all forty parts under the Second Subcontract based on the
same economic pressures that induced Loral to agree to price increases
under the First Subcontract.
Had Loral challenged the Second Subcontract on the basis of duress,
the enforceability of the agreement is not certain under a good faith
analysis. It would seem that Loral would have a pretty strong argument
that the Second Subcontract was not fair in relation to the market changes
that justified the price increases under the First Subcontract because it was
an entirely new contract. In this connection, the comments to Second
Restatement section 176 state that A's threat of non-performance of an
existing contract is "ordinarily improper" if it is used to induce B to enter
into an entirely separate contract.387 At the same time, Austin might argue
384. Professor Mather notes that an economic analysis does not address the extent to
which a. modification should be enforced. Mather, supra note 24, at 642. Mather argues
that the modification should be enforced only to the extent of the "Inducement Term." Id.
The Inducement Term is the extent to which A is better off by breaching the contract than
performing it. Id. at 644.
385. Although recognizing the arguments that the doctrine of duress should not look to
the substantive fairness of the deal, the substance of the deal should be evaluated where it is
relevant to determining good faith. See Giesel, supra note 14, at 483-87 (arguing that duress
inquiry should not look to substance of the deal); but see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 176(2), supra note 346 (focusing on the fairness of the exchange to determine
whether the threat was improper); see also Mather, supra note 24, at 648.
386. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
387. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. e (1981).
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that the Second Subcontract was another way to counteract the $70,000 in
losses that justified its request to modify the First Subcontract.
These factors are only suggestions and, undoubtedly, there are other
factors that could be incorporated into a good faith analysis.
In sum, in the context of contract modification, it appears that the
duress inquiry is most aptly reduced to whether A can be said to have made
the threat in good faith. While it is not certain how a good faith analysis
would play out in a wider array of cases, applying a good faith analysis in
the context of Austin v. Loral appears to more fairly balance the parties'
interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the New York Court of Appeals majority held that Austin v.
Loral was a "classic case" of economic duress, the close division of judicial
opinion suggested a richer story, that perhaps the case was not so clear-
cut. 388 In reconstructing the story, it emerges that, due to the escalation of
the conflict in Vietnam, the market demand for Loral's radar sets had
increased and, in turn, so had the demand for Austin's gear part
components. At the same time, Austin's material and labor costs had risen,
and Austin was losing a substantial sum of money on the First Subcontract.
Austin mentioned the market shifts and, in doing so, characterized the
undisputed events in a sympathetic way, but it did not reframe the legal
issue to make this characterization doctrinally relevant. Had Austin
refrained the issue as one of contract modification, it could have provided
the Court of Appeals with a frame in which the market changes were
doctrinally relevant and significant. Indeed, this might have changed the
outcome of the case. From the time it penned the July 22, 1966 letter,
Loral framed the question as one of economic duress, and Austin never
attempted to reframe the dispute.
Alternatively, Austin could have argued for a more sensible common
law doctrine of economic duress--one that did not solely focus on Loral's
388. "Psychological theory... suggest[s] that most people are inclined to avoid
ambiguity by reducing conflicts in their lives to one clearly right position and one
clearly wrong position. Interestingly, judicial opinions reflect this tendency, so
often suggesting that the outcome of the case is clear-cut, without doubt or moral
complexity." Little, supra note 280, at 379-80.
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lack of choices. Because the court did not factor in the market increases
but, rather, focused on Loral's lack of alternatives, the duress inquiry, by
default, treated Loral's interests as paramount.389
In the contract modification context, the Second Restatement appears
to be heading away from the traditional common law doctrine and toward a
good faith inquiry. The combination of Restatement Sections 89, 175 and
176 distills to (1) an inquiry into B's choices and (2) whether A's threat
was made in good faith. Because the inquiry into B's choices is redundant
with the lawsuit, it appears that the inquiry is most appropriately whether A
can be said to have made the threat in good faith. This good faith inquiry
looks to whether A had a legitimate commercial reason for requesting the
modification and whether the resulting modification is fair in relation to
that reason. This inquiry can incorporate suggested factors, such as A's
economic incentives in making the threat. In the context of Austin v. Loral,
it appears that a good faith inquiry would have more fairly assessed the
parties' interests in light of the change in circumstances.
Further research should reveal whether the case law has treated the
common law doctrine of economic duress as subsumed by a good faith
inquiry in the modification context. Where a request for a contract
modification was made in the context of a market shift that comes to
involve a loss, cases under Article Two of the U.C.C. have looked to the
good faith of the party requesting the modification.39 ° Certainly, requests
for contract modifications do not necessarily involve goods and, therefore,
may not directly implicate the U.C.C. modification analysis. In one recent
case with some factual similarities to Austin v. Loral, a court applied
common law principles to hold that a request for a contract modification
was coercive, and determined the wrongfulness of that request for the
modification based on whether it was made in good faith.391 This was due,
389. In the modification context, determining whether the doctrine of duress is applicable
becomes less of line-drawing problem and more of a determination "which of the two
parties' interests to treat as paramount." CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 15, at 69-70.
390. See, e.g., Roth Steel, 705 F.2d at 145; American Exploration Co. v. Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp., 779 F.2d 310, 313-314 (6th Cir. 1985).
391. See Rumsfeld v. Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Rumsfeld also
involved a military contract - in that case, the contractor agreed to provide the government
with ready-to-eat meals. Id. at 1323. There, the contractor claimed that it agreed to a
modification of the contract under duress because the government threatened to withhold
progress payments unless the contractor agreed to the modification. Id. at 1331. The court
held that the request for modification was coercive because the threat to withhold payments
was not made in good faith, but, rather, "for the sole purpose of pressuring the contractor
into signing [the modification]." Id.
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at least in part, to the Second Restatement, which already appears to
collapse the duress doctrine into a good faith inquiry in the modification
context. Moreover, further research should determine whether a good faith
inquiry would more fairly assess the parties' interests in a wider array of
circumstances.392 A close analysis of Austin v. Loral suggests that a good
faith inquiry would better balance the parties' interests by taking into
account the reasons for A's (or, Austin's) threat.
392. Take for example the popular pre-existing duty case of Schwartzreich v. Bauman-
Basch, Inc., 231 NY 196 (1921). There, Schwartzreich, a coat designer, was paid $90 a
week by his employer. When Schwartzreich received a job offer from another employer
offering to pay him $110 a week, Schwartzreich told his boss he would breach his
employment contract and terminate his employment unless he received a raise. The boss
agreed to pay Schwartzreich $100 a week to stay. When the boss later fired Schwartzreich,
Schwartzreich sued for breach of their employment agreement. The employer's failed
defense was the pre-existing duty rule: he argued that there was no consideration to bind the
new employment agreement because Schwartzreich was already bound to perform the same
work under the existing employment agreement. Imagine, however, that the employer
instead asserted the defense of duress. The employer would then have to show that
Schwartzreich's request for modification was in bad faith. However, it seems that
Schwartzreich had a legitimate commercial reason for making the request: he could get
more money elsewhere for his coat designing. Further, the resulting $10 a week wage
increase is certainly fair in relation to the $110 Schwartzreich could have received from
another employer. Indeed, a good faith inquiry appears to fairly serves both parties, and
they both appear to be "better off' with an enforceable, modified employment agreement.
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AUSTI INSTRUME4NT, IM1.
M12 EIL. WAY
SYOS5CT. LONG tSLAN4D. N. Y.
WAL~ft 5,26M
July 27. 19G6
Looral Blectronia Systems .
825 atonx River Avenuo
Bronw. 19.Y. 10472
Atts Mr-. J. Probman
entlexae;
oat A Rm _ our telephone conversation of today. we accept the
t az d Conditions of your letter of July 22, 1966. including
the tbj~ee itms whic were omitted from your letter as liUted
beleom
• an 00 Otv Dlivetre Present Price f
6771-114 1045 621 0.00 8.90
.6771-126 104S 00 0.75 11.25
6779-107 390 CoMlete 9.00 13.20
Please note that on P/S 6777-101. our records Lndicae 1009 p.,
fthippedl you Uftcate 1007 pas., and *on P/a 6776-112, our records
Indicate 342 pea. shipped; you indicate 295 pas.
X understend that amndeats to the above and the new order. will
be rzelesat siultaneously. The now orders are in a-cordant. with
our quote of Jhnie 14, 1966, and include all items which we are
jrsently Manufacturing, plus P/9 6771-408, 6771--137 6777-105,
6m7-218 and 6779-120
KIAny Mail delivexy schedules an soo as possible, and ,e will
eau' every effort to meet them.
Very truly yo3s.
-zKS ZS~UYIIf4C
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Loral Electronic SystemsA &.460 Lo oAL CO.05oAftn
M URDOKX RIR AVMUL TNC aOND. KLY. 16020 T0. "t2 , t.9
August 4. 16
Austin instrumenit. Inc.
123)1 6ieft. WAY
Attention. Mr. Edmand Krauss. Plesldenlt
Contleen: 
your July 27 letter reached us on July 29. Ve gaoatly set about
prepar;ig the supplementS you require.
For the reasons outlined in our July 2) letter. we feiterate that
we find ourselves In no position to take essue with ttlher the prCIVI inCreases
or other conditions you have specified as the basis for continuing with per-
formance of the*Purchase Orders or subcontrects between uS.
We also noto.frm. your July 27 letter and telephone notification
that jpou require your price increases to apply to three other Tteas (P/9 6771-
114. 6771-116 and 6779-107)o. which you state ware omitted from our July Ui
letter, and further, that you have added amther elment or condition. namely,
that upon delivtry to you of the contract supplaernts. covering all of your
price increases, we- siaulternAvusy place with you Purchase Orders for added
quntitlas of the some gears. gear essebltles and machined part coponents
for the add-on Rader Dopplers Al/APN-|53 quantities ordered frem us by the
U. S. Covrntent to mest Its aug=ented military needs for this critical
equipent. ad that these new Purchease Orders be placed with you at prices
per your quotations of June 14. 4966.
As to the purported delivery diecrepencles referred to in paragrap.s
2 of your July 27 letter, I.o., your stat ment of 100 p shipped as against
ours of 1007 Pas recalvd an P/la 6777-101 '" 34 Pee Shipped " against oWs
of 295 pa received on P/N 6776-112, we would be willing to accept your figures.
Actually. howeter. as to P/i 6777-101 (P.O.13020). a recheck wiii show th: the
see part consists of three different clesslfications and chat your price increase
should only apply to the first clssifitlIon Identified In the order as Ites 91
relating to a quantity of 10. pieces. Tour price Increases should. therefore.
properly .epply in this fashion: 10% price incruase an the 10 (o ftur igere)
pieces received end paid for; your new price of $4.60. Increased free $2.4.
should apply to the balance of 36 preces still to be delivered end our appll-
cable price increase supplem-t reflcts this. Va believe our figures to be
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Loral EIcct-anic SystpSe 2
correct as to P/M 6776-112, I.e., 2%5 pieces received &d can later send yo
dotailcd clorifylng inforr.tnoi In this regard. Tho pplicable price increase
supplne.nt for this part. however, re'lccts your 342 piece figure. We urge
that any quistions relating to'this paragraph Wich any cause further delay be
deferred for odjustment. because we cannot over-erhoslze the very critical
emergency situation that confronts us.
The opening paragraph of your July 17 lower speaks of your accept&c
of the teras and conditions of our July 22 letter. We cal I attention to the
fa ct that It Is, rather, we l A'flnd ourselves vithout choice but to accept
your. teras and conditions.
Again
. 
In the Interest of time, we are hand-delIvering th&$%"I*-
mental Agrea.ts to you with this letter which cover your price Increases and
the new Purchase Orders for the add-on quantities. Subject to the Ino.- adjust-
smnts referred io In paragraph 3 above, you will fInd they coeply In all respects
with your conditions and requr"1Tants.
With respect to your exlstirg delinquencies in delivery. to have also,
par your reqUast and by telegrao dated July 29, 1966, extended your delivery
schedules Lo cover past delivery slippages.
In short, the drastic and overwhelming circumstances are such that we
yiold.to lI of, your terms aWd coditions Lad can only urge that you resu= work
lwqidiately to enabli us to eet the exIstIng mijltary exigencies ad relie us
of th economic, threat against defaulting on our own prieo contract obligations
vlth the U. S. Government far these adar DPeolers on contracts which In the
eggregate at this tics run In excess of $8,000.000o.
Vea.sk you to sign copies of the Supplemental Agrements end
ckno*ledgent copies of the new Purchase Orders for return %o.%s through the
bearer. We have Instructed his to weit as long as It moy be necessary to mect
your convenience for thIs purpose.
Very truly yours.
WPAL CLECTROEIC SYSTEMS
A Iision of Loral Corporation
aes brcfaa
Kanager of Operatlons
Te add-m option quantity of 585 pi eces of P/9 6777-101 appezrin SSforoer Sqpla t 16 of Purcase Order 3020 (unocrnowledged by you) end
SS piaces of P/9 677l 126 ap earing on forr Sa-ilement 12 of Purchasc Order
5362) (nackUnowledged by you) haMv been transforrd to and am. ear on ou
Puclie orir 8441111.
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Loral Electronic Systems
A CU .c 004 tl*AL COR0FOA0
Oft 040M RMI R AVEZ%. THI BRON& H. N 0. 10 2 0 M 212 R 21
July. 21, 1967
Austinf Instruzment, Ine. @ijU m 29 !123 Miean Way
AttcntL4;6 : )W. B. Brauss, President AUSN-IC
Valle the applicable Subcontracts with Your Company Identified
in prior correspondence for vitl ear cmpounts were in tbe
poess of manufacture by you, your Company tbreatened stoppage
I a.s Loral agreed to comply vith your demand* fe retroacmve
and prospotive price Increases.
Considering the, critical defeuse needs for the AN/APM-253 end
Item Radar Doppler* in which your Sor components were utilized,
tbor unavailtabilty elsewtero In ti. to mot existing delivery
co ltmenut and our own oblaIaton8 to the Unlted- States Govern-
=out conotratually, our company vas forced to yiel to your do-
uan~. We refer you to .cocuc ent corespondence on tbs. subject.
We are advisod that such price Increases may not be retaine. L%
m&t acoordingly notify you that unless tese -price Increases are
credited or refunded to us In rul, appropl-ate action vil be
ta en to secure our legal right.s in the matter.
Vezy tKuly joUvfs
ZOMAL EC 8ZGVC SSMM4S
A Division of Loral Corporation
JP:fh rhen
lanager of Oporation.
r • -- 6-
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